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INTRODUCTION

Few aspects of life, it seems, are insulated from the effects of
globalization. The cultural and economic consequences of this phenomenon attract considerable attention. This article addresses a question
less frequently addressed: the interplay between court systems in the
United States and international judicial institutions.
Such institutions are organized on what would appear to be a number of different patterns. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) hears
only disputes between governments.' The European Court of Human
Rights will address claims against governments brought by individuals
as well as by other governments, but its judgments, at least formally, are
not enforceable in the court systems of those countries which are subject
to its jurisdiction. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights will hear
*

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B., Princeton,

1970; J.D., University of Michigan, 1976. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
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1. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 35, 59 Stat. 1055,
<http://www.icj-cij.org /icjwww /ibasicdocuments.htm> [hereinafter ICJ Statute].

2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S.
45; Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55; Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; and Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155;
Rudolf Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 37-38 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993); NEVILLE
MARCH HUNNINGS, THE EUROPEAN COURTS 36 (1996).
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claims against countries only if brought either by other countries or by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but its judgments
awarding compensatory damages are enforceable in the domestic legal
systems of those states which accept its jurisdiction.3
Each sentence in the foregoing paragraph is supported by a reference to a particular treaty. It might well seem, therefore, that the subject
described in the first paragraph ought not call for a lengthy discussion.
If the United States elects to adhere to the treaty establishing a particular international tribunal, it accepts whatever arrangement the treaty
establishes. By refusing to adhere to a given treaty, the United States
can avoid becoming subject to an international tribunal the organization
of which the United States finds, for some reason, objectionable.
This conclusion, however, begs several questions. It assumes, first,
that the obligations created by a given treaty are predictable, allowing
the avoidance of obligations a country does not wish to assume. Second,
the conclusion assumes that the United States is free to accept such obligations as might seem advisable. Finally, none of this discussion
addresses the question of what obligations this country ought to accept.
But the answers to these begged or ignored questions cannot simply
be assumed. An apparently straightforward treaty may have unexpected
applications. While the United States certainly can avoid the effects of a
given treaty by avoiding adherence to the treaty, the Constitution may
preclude its adherence to a treaty seen, for some reason, as desirable.
And the issue of the obligations the United States ought to accept cannot
be addressed without considering a host of factors, most obviously, the
extent to which the United States should permit itself to be constrained
by international institutions it cannot necessarily control.
Each of these questions was presented, at least implicitly, by the
case of Breard v. Greene, decided in the spring of 1998. Though the
Supreme Court finessed the question whether the courts of the United
States are obliged to give effect to ICJ judgments that are binding in
international law, that issue-turning on the legal effects of American
adherence to the Statute of the ICJ-at least lurked in the background of
Breard. And that issue implies a second: if the Statute of the ICJ in fact
requires the United States to give domestic effect to ICJ judgments,
does the Constitution permit adherence to the Statute? Finally, and most
fundamentally, would it make sense to subordinate, in some respect,
American courts to international tribunals? What would be gained, and
what lost, from such an arrangement?
3. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 61, 68, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 [hereinafter American Convention].
4.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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For those who might consider these matters of more intellectual
than practical import, certain points must be stressed. First, issues quite
similar to those present in Breard have arisen subsequent to that decision,5 and may recur.6 Moreover, much (though not all7) academic
commentary has been critical of the decision in Breard.8 There is thus a
potential for a reappearance of the issue of the relationship between
American courts and the ICJ (and, presumably, other international tribunals) coupled with marked disagreement within the American legal
community as to how this issue should properly be analyzed. Most fundamentally, the depth and range of international interactions seem to be
expanding almost daily; it requires an extraordinary lack of imagination
to assume that this trend will somehow fail to impact the American
5. In Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations (Germany v. United States), 38 I.L.M.
308 (I.C.J. 1999), Germany obtained an ex parte order indicating provisional measures in a
case involving the failure of Arizona authorities to follow the Vienna Convention upon arresting a German national, Walter LaGrand. LaGrand had been convicted of murder and was
scheduled to be executed on March 3, 1999, the day after Germany filed its application for
provisional measures. Id. at 310. The Court's March 3 order called for the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings .... " However, the Court's opinion stated its understanding that stopping the execution was within the authority of the governor of Arizona, and
characterized the responsibilities of the United States Government as transmitting the order
to the Governor. Id. at 313. On March 3, Germany sought leave to file a bill of complaint in
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, seeking preliminary injunctions against both
the United States and Governor Hull of Arizona which would have required staying LaGrand's execution. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 143 L. Ed. 2d 192, 194
(1999). The Court denied the petitions. Regarding the claim against the United States, the
Court expressed doubt that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity or that Article III's grant of jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors or consuls was applicable. Id.
As for Arizona, the Court reiterated the doubts expressed in Breard v. Greene that the Vienna Convention conferred on foreign governments the right to sue in domestic courts for its
violation. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 143 L. Ed. at 194. The Court also
noted the "probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles." Id. In addition, it
stressed the ex parte character of the ICJ's order, and the tardiness of Germany's action, as
Germany learned of the matter in 1992 and the execution was scheduled on January 15,
1999. Id.
6. Other states whose nationals were denied rights under the Vienna Convention could
seek relief from the ICJ; individuals denied that relief have done so. See, e.g., Faulder v.
Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 136 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1996).
7. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to
U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 675 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Justiciability of Paraguay'sClaim of Treaty
Violation, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 697 (1998); Louis Henkin, ProvisionalMeasures, U.S. Treaty
Obligations,and the States, id. at 679; Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard
Matter, id. at 704; Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular
Convention, id. at 691; Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution of Angel Breard by the
United States: Violating an Order of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 12 TEMPLE INT'L &
COMp. L.J. 121 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708
(1998); Carlos Manuel V6zquez, Breard and the FederalPower to Require Compliance with
ICJ Orders of ProvisionalMeasures, id. at 683.
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judicial system in some way or other, quite possibly in circumstances
quite different from those raised by Breard.
This article seeks to deal systematically with a number of issues
necessarily raised in any consideration of the relationships between
American courts and international tribunals. The first section sets out
the facts of Breard.The next discusses the scope of the obligations imposed by the Statute of the ICJ. The third section considers the
constitutional questions at least implicit in Breard; in particular, it seeks
to address the tantalizing question left open by Holmes in Missouri v.
Holland:9 what is the "different way" in which "qualifications to the
treaty-making power" are to be determined? The final substantive section seeks to identify the costs and benefits that would be created if the
courts in the United States deferred to the ICJ or to other international
tribunals to a greater extent than took place in Breard.
I. THE FACTS
In 1992, Virginia authorities arrested a Paraguayan national, Angel
Francisco Breard, for murder.'0 Those authorities were required by the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations" (Vienna Convention) to inform Breard of his rights to have the Paraguayan consul notified of his
arrest and to consult with the consul; they did not do so.2 Breard was
subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and was
scheduled to be executed on April 14, 1998."3 On April 3, 1998, Paraguay brought an action against the United States in the ICJ grounded on
the breach of the Vienna Convention in Breard's case.' 4 In light of the
imminence of Breard's execution, Paraguay sought from the Court an
order indicating that, as a provisional measure, the United States should
act to ensure that Breard was not executed pending the disposition of the
case by the ICJ. 5
The ICJ responded to Paraguay's request with an order dated April
9, 1998.'" In this order, after observing that the United States had acknowledged that Breard had not been informed of his rights under the
9. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
10. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 812, 813 (I.C.J.

1998).
11. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 78,
101; 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
12. Para. v. U.S., 37 I.L.M. at 813.
13. Id. at 814.
14. Id. at 812-13.

15. Id. at 814.
16. Id. at 812.
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Vienna Convention as required by that instrument, satisfying itself that
it had jurisdiction over the case, and observing that Breard's execution
would cause irreparable harm to the rights Paraguay was asserting," the
Court indicated the following provisional measures:'"
The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court
of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this
Order ..
9
Earlier, prior to the initiation of the ICJ action, Breard had sought
relief unsuccessfully in the lower federal courts, as had Paraguay and its
ambassador to and consul-general in the United States. All had subsequently petitioned for writs of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. Once the ICJ had issued its order, Breard petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay of
execution in order to enforce the ICJ's order.2' Paraguay and the Paraguayan officials likewise sought to bring an original action before the
Supreme Court.2
The Supreme Court dealt with all of these requests for relief in its
decision in Breard v. Greene.23 Regarding both the petition in the original jurisdiction and the certiorari petition sought by Paraguay and its
officials, the Court held that Paraguay had no private right of action under the Vienna Convention and was in any case barred from seeking
relief against Virginia in a federal court by the Eleventh Amendment; it
also held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, urged as an additional basis for his
claim by the consul-general, was inapplicable.24 The Court likewise denied the relief Breard sought personally, holding that his failure to raise
17. Para. v. U.S., 37 I.L.M. at 816-19.
18. There is some disagreement as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is binding as a matter of international law. The United States, appearing in Breard as
amicus curiae,took the position that such orders are not binding as a matter of international
law, Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 49-5 1,Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)
(Nos. 97-1390 (A-738) and 97-8214 (A-732)) [hereinafter Brief for the United States], citing
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 903

reporter's note 6 (1987), for the proposition that the question is at least debatable. This article assumes that such orders are binding as a matter of international law in order to sharpen
the focus of the discussion. Indeed, if such orders are not binding, it would seem that the
Supreme Court's action in Breard could hardly be characterized as legally incorrect, whatever one's views of its wisdom.
19. Para. v. U.S., 37 I.L.M. at 819.
20. Breard,523 U.S. at 373-74.
21. Id. at 374.
22. Id. at 374-75.
23. Id. at 371.
24. Id. at 377-78.
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the Vienna Convention defense in the Virginia state courts barred him
from raising it in subsequent collateral federal proceedings. The Court
added that, even if Breard were permitted to raise the argument, he
would lose on it, since relief could not be granted in such circumstances
absent a showing that the violation of the Vienna Convention had somehow negatively affected Breard's situation at trial, and the admitted
facts of the case were inconsistent with any such showing.25
Conspicuous by its absence from the Court's opinion was any discussion of the legal effect of the ICJ's order on the matter. The Court
referred to the order only in passing, characterizing it as a "request" that
the United States "'take all measures at its disposal"' to prevent
Breard's execution 6 Also, the Court described Breard's petition as
seeking to enforce the ICJ's order, placing the word "enforce" in quotation marks.2 7 And of course, in denying the petitions, the Court
necessarily, if implicitly, held that it did not see itself as constrained by
the order. Nonetheless, there was no discussion of the reasoning which
supported this result.
II. ICJ DECISIONS AND DOMESTIC LAW
This article proceeds on the assumption that the ICJ order involved
in the Breard case was binding as a matter of international law. Based
on this assumption, the United States as an entity was obliged to obey
the ICJ order, incurring international responsibility if it failed to do so.28
It does not follow, however, that this international legal obligation
required American courts to carry out the ICJ's order. The fact that the
United States had an obligation does not indicate which officials within
the federal and state governments had the responsibility of implementing the obligation. Rather, the issue turns on the proper interpretation of
the international instruments which create the obligation in question.
The Statute of the ICJ provides that its judgments are "final and
without appeal."29 The Statute does not address the effect of ICJ judgments in other legal proceedings. The only instrument addressing the
carrying out of those judgments is the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 94 of the Charter provides:

25. Id. at 375-79.
26. Id. at 374.
27. Id.

28. 1 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE
1920-1996, at 221-26 (3d ed. 1997).

LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,

29. ICJ Statute, supra note I, art. 60.
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1.

Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any
case to which it is a party.

2.

If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court,
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations
or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment."

The absence from Article 94 of any mention of enforcement of ICJ
judgments by domestic judiciaries suggests that Security Council action
was intended to be the sole mechanism by which those judgments could
be carried out. Further, it is important to note that Article 94 confers on
the Security Council a high degree of discretion regarding enforcement
of ICJ judgments. The Council is not obliged to give effect to those
judgments; rather, it is permitted to do so, if it thinks the step necessary.
Also, if it acts, the means it chooses to employ are also matters of its
discretion. If there were an absolute obligation on the judiciaries of nations litigating matters before the ICJ to enforce ICJ judgments, the
discretion which Article 94 explicitly confers on the Security Council
might well be compromised. After all, if a state had the option to seek
domestic court enforcement of an ICJ judgment, the actual discretion of
the Security Council would be limited, since the Council's members
would be aware that their ability to control the enforcement process was
less than complete. Such a de facto limitation on the Security Council is
difficult to square with the scope that Article 94 clearly leaves for the
exercise of the judgment of the Council.
This argument for the lack of direct domestic effect of ICJ judgments is reinforced by a consideration of the General Act on Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes3' (General Act) and its successor,
the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes32 (Revised General Act). These instruments require submission of
disputes between nations who are parties to them either to arbitration or
to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in the case of the
General Act,33 or the International Court of Justice, in the case of the
Revised General Act." Each contains the following article:

30. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Sept. 26, 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter General Act].
Apr. 28, 1949, 71 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Revised General Act].
General Act, supra note 31, art. 17 at 351.
Revised General Act, supra note 32, art. 17 at 110.
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If, in a judicial sentence or arbitral award, it is declared that a
judgment, or a measure enjoined by a court of law or other
authority of one of the parties to the dispute, is wholly or in part
contrary to international law, and if the constitutional law of
that party does not permit or only partially permits the consequences of the judgment or measure in question to be annulled,
the parties agree that the judicial sentence or arbitral award shall
grant the injured party equitable satisfaction."
This language in essence requires the international courts to take
account, in their judgments, of the possibility that the court systems of
governments litigating before them would be forbidden by domestic law
from giving effect to those judgments. The language makes sense only
if the drafters of these treaties and the parties to them assumed that
judgments of the Permanent Court and the ICJ did not necessarily have
domestic legal effects. If those judgments did necessarily have such effects, according to their founding instruments, it would violate those
treaties to require the courts to tailor their judgments to the domestic
legal systems of the litigants; rather, the international legal obligation
assumed by submitting to the courts' jurisdiction would perforce include the obligation to alter the domestic legal system to accommodate
a judgment from one of the international courts.
Of course, the article cited above is of little help in determining domestic courts' obligations regarding ICJ judgments if states were
unwilling to subscribe to a treaty containing it. That was not the case
with respect to the language in question, however. Nineteen states are
parties to the General Act;3 6 eight, including three which are not parties
to the General Act, are parties to the Revised General Act.37 Furthermore, similar language is contained in a number of bilateral treaties, 38
and in the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.39 When the parties to all of these instruments are totaled, it

35. General Act, supra note 31, art. 32 at 357; Revised General Act, supra note 32, art.

32 at 118.
36. 2

PETER

H.

ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX

37. United Nations,
GENERAL: STATUS AS AT

MULTILATERAL

30

APRIL

165 (2d ed. 1983).

TREATIES

DEPOSITED

WITH

THE

SECRETARY-

1999, at 35, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17, U.N. Sales

No. E.99.V.5 (1999).
38. Treaty of Friendship Conciliation and Judicial Settlement, Mar. 24, 1950, Turk.Italy, art. 20, 96 U.N.T.S. 207, 219; Agreement Concerning Conciliation and Judicial Settlement, Nov. 24, 1954, Italy-Braz., art. 18, 284 U.N.T.S. 325, 334; see also treaties listed in
UNITED NATIONS, SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF IN-

1928-1948 at 291-94, U.N. Sales No. 1949.V.3 (1949).
39. April 29, 1957, art. 30, 320 U.N.T.S. 243, 256.

TERNATIONAL DISPUTES
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develops that forty-one countries40 have seen no conflict between
agreeing to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal and the possibility that the judgments of that tribunal could not be
applied within the domestic legal system of an opposing litigant. It is
also relevant that the General Assembly resolution revising the General
Act 4' was adopted by a vote of 45-6-1.42 In short, at least a significant
minority of states have assumed that the judgments of the ICJ and its
predecessor did not necessarily have domestic legal effects.
While court decisions addressing the domestic legal effects of
judgments by either the Permanent Court or the ICJ could also prove
enlightening, there are too few to provide much guidance. In considering such of these cases as there are, 43 it is helpful to reflect on the ways
in which a judicial decision can bear on a subsequent judicial decision.
First, the earlier decision can be seen by the court in a later, factually
unrelated case as persuasive with respect to a legal issue common to the
two cases; the later court is inclined to reach a result similar to that
reached in the earlier case because of the cogency of the reasoning supporting the earlier decision, rather than because the later court sees itself
as legally bound to follow the legal rule laid down in the earlier case.
Second, the earlier case can be seen as establishing a legal precedent
binding on the court in a later, factually unrelated case raising a legal
issue decided by the earlier court. Third, the later case may be factually
related to an earlier, separate case decided by a different court; the court
in the later case may apply the doctrines of claim or issue preclusion so
as to bar relitigation either of factual issues or of issues involving the
application of law to fact. Finally, a later case may be, not merely factually related to an earlier case, but an aspect of that case, as proceedings
in one court to enforce a judgment rendered by a different court may be
seen as addressing aspects of the same case decided by the earlier judgment. In this situation as well-the one most closely fitting the facts of
Breard-the later court might see itself as constrained to deal with the
matter before it in a manner consistent with the earlier disposition of the
case.

40. See authorities cited in notes 36-38, supra and DIRECTORATE

OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART SHOWING SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF CONVENTIONS
AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITHIN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE at

53-54 (1999).

41. G.A. Res. 268 (III), U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/900 at 10
(1949).
42. UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1948-49 at 415, U.N. Sales
No. 1950.1.11 (1950).

43. The cases discussed were collected in Rosenne, supra note 28, at 223-24, 225 n. 47,
226-27 n. 48.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:877

When one turns to cases dealing with the effects in domestic legal
system of judgments of international tribunals, one finds only one in
which a litigant sought to treat a municipal case as falling in this last
category-that is, as simply an aspect of a matter earlier decided by an
international court. In "Socobel" v. Greek State,44 a Belgian corporation
sought to execute, in the Belgian courts, on a judgment against Greece
rendered decision twelve years earlier by the Permanent Court of International Justice.4 ' The case could not proceed in the Belgian courts,
however, unless the judgment of the Permanent Court was seen as that
of a tribunal superior to those of Belgium, as opposed to being simply a
foreign judgment. The Belgian court held that the Permanent Court's
judgments were those of a foreign tribunal, and therefore not subject to
execution in Belgium until a claimant went through the procedures generally required for executing foreign judgments. The court further held,
that, in any event, the corporation had not been a party to the dispute
before the Permanent Court, in which the litigants were Belgium and
Greece.46 In other words, the court in this case rejected the argument that
a decision of the Permanent Court could have a direct domestic legal
effect with respect to an aspect of the matter litigated before the Permanent Court.
Only one case, Administration des Habous v. Deal, 47 treats an ICJ
decision as binding precedent. The ICJ had held in an earlier case that
Americans were generally not exempt from the jurisdiction of French
courts in Morocco.48 In Deal, a French lower court in Morocco had held
itself without jurisdiction to hear an eviction suit brought against an
American national. The Court of Appeal of Rabat reversed, apparently
relying on the ICJ judgment as binding precedent.49 However the Court
of Appeal of the International Tribunal at Tangier refused to follow the
same I.C.J. decision in Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company v. Lal-la
5 0 The court relied in part
Fatma Bent si Mohamed el Khadar and Others.
on the fact that the ICJ had expressly limited its consideration to the
rights of American citizens in the French zone of Morocco, of which
Tangier was not a part. It also held, however, that ICJ judgments, not

44. 18 I.L.R. 3 (Belg., Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles 1951).
45. The PCIJ had held that an earlier arbitration between the corporation and Greece
was valid. Soci6t6 Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece) 1939 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No.
78 (June 15).
46. Socobel, 18 I.L.R. at 4-5.
47. 19 I.L.R. 342 (Morocco, Ct. App. Rabat 1952).
48. Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.) 1952
I.C.J. 175 (Aug. 27).
49. Deal, 19 I.L.R. at 343-44.
50. 21 I.L.R. 136 (Tangier, Ct. App. Int'l Trib. 1954).
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being binding in domestic courts, could have at most persuasive force,
and that in any case such judgments bound only the governments who
were parties to them, not individuals litigating similar matters.
No other domestic case accords ICJ decisions more than persuasive
force.5 Thus, the courts in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company v. Idimitsu
Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha12 and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company v.
S.U.P.O.R. Company53 cited the ICJ's decision in Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (U.K v. Iran) 4 in holding that the oil company was not entitled to recover from third parties oil produced by the oil company in
Iran and subsequently nationalized; in neither case, however, was the
ICJ's decision treated as determining. Rather, that case was cited along
with a number of other authorities. And the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia ignored the thrust of the ICJ's opinion in
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by holding that the oil company was essentially an alter ego of the government of the United Kingdom and
therefore entitled to rely on sovereign immunity in defense to a subpoena. 55
Other cases cite ICJ decisions favorably in contexts irrelevant to issues before the court56 or for issues presented but not contested. 7 Also,
the court in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ld. v. Jaffrate58 relied on, among
other things, the ICJ's indication of provisional measures in

51. According to a summary at 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 267 (1955), the French Court of Cassation cited the Rights of Nationals case in Bendayan, Bulletin des Arrets de la Cour de
Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, 1954 at 182 (March 4, 1954), upholding the jurisdiction of

French courts in Morocco over criminal cases brought against American citizens. The summary does not make clear, however, exactly what force the French court attributed to the ICJ
decision.
52. 20 I.L.R. 305 (Japan, High Ct. Tokyo 1953).
53. 22 I.L.R. 23 (Italy, Civ. Ct. Rome 1954).
54. 1952 I.C.J. 92 (July 22).
55. In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum in Possible Violation of Title 15 U.S.
Code, Sections 1-23, 1952-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 167,385 at 68,001-02 (D.D.C. Dec. 15,
1952). The ICJ had held itself without jurisdiction to hear the United Kingdom's claim on
behalf of the company seeking relief for the Iranian nationalization of the company's con-

cession on the ground that Iran's consent to the Court's jurisdiction was limited to questions
involving treaties and that the contract between the company and Iran was simply a private

contract, not a treaty. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 1952 I.C.J. at 112. In so holding, the ICJ distinguished between the company and the United Kingdom, a distinction inconsistent with the
equation of the two by the District Court for the District of Columbia.

56. Rex v. Cooper, 20 I.L.R. 166 (Sup. Ct. Nor. 1953); Rex v. Martin, 20 I.L.R. 167
(Sup. Ct. Nor. 1953).

57. In re Kriger, 18 I.L.R. 258 (Neth., Council for the Restoration of Legal Rights, Jud.
Div. 1951).
58. [1953] 1. W.L.R. 246 (U.K.).
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company59 to hold that a purchaser from Iran of oil

claimed by the company must have known of the company's
claims and
6
therefore could not be considered a good faith purchaser. 0
Doubts as to the direct domestic effects of ICJ judgments are reinforced by a consideration of international agreements establishing other
international tribunals. A number of such agreements provide for the
final and binding character of the judgments of such tribunals in language similar to that of the ICJ Statute, but have been interpreted as
having no direct effect in the legal systems of those countries which are
parties to the treaties. Thus, the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms6 ' provides that the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are final.6 ' The
judgments of that court, however, are not directly enforceable in the
nations which are parties to the Convention unless domestic law provides for their enforcement.63 Similarly, the instrument providing for the
establishment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 64 states that
"[a]ll decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.' ' 5
The tribunal has described the nature of this obligations as follows:
This good faith obligation leaves a considerable latitude to the
States Parties as to the nature of the procedures and mechanisms
by which Tribunal awards rendered against their nationals may
be enforced. The Tribunal has no authority under the Algiers
Declarations to prescribe the means by which each of the States
provides for such enforcement. Certainly, if no enforcement
procedure were available in a State Party, or if recourse to such
procedure were eventually to result in a refusal to implement
Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their enforcement, this would
violate the State's obligations under the Algiers Declarations. It
is therefore incumbent on each State Party to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement may be obtained
within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the successful
Party has access thereto. If procedures did not already exist as
59. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 88 (July 5) (Request for Indication

of Interim Measures of Protection).
60. Jaffrate, I W.L.R. at 261-62.
61. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 2.
62. Id. art. 44.
63. BERNHARDT, supra note 2; see also HUNNINGS, supra note 2.
64. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2047, at 3 (1981); 20
I.L.M. 230 (1981).
65. Id. art. IV. 1, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 4; 20 I.L.M. at 232.
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part of the State's legal system they would have to be established, by means of legislation or other appropriate measures.
Such procedures must be available on a basis at least as favorable as that allowed to parties who seek recognition or
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.66
This language clearly indicates that the Tribunal did not believe its
awards' status as "final and binding" made those awards directly enforceable in domestic tribunals. Rather, the Tribunal assumed that
changes in domestic law might be necessary to render those awards enforceable. Further, the Tribunal did not see the parties to the agreement
as obliged to accord full res judicata effect to awards; rather, treatment
as favorable as that accorded foreign arbitral awards was adequate. The
court in Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp..7 relied on this language
in denying full res judicata effect to an award of the Tribunal, refusing
to enforce one such award68 on the basis of a defense made available
under the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement
69
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
To be sure, there are international tribunals whose judgments are directly enforceable in the courts of nations who are parties to the treaties
establishing the tribunals. Those treaties, however, make express provision for such domestic enforcement. 7' There is no similar language in
the Statute of the International Court of Justice or in the Charter of the
United Nations.
In summary, it seems that ICJ judgments were not intended to be directly enforceable in domestic courts. The instruments establishing the
ICJ envisage a form of enforcement of that tribunal's judgments quite
different from, and in some respects antithetical to, enforcement in domestic courts. Treaties that involve a significant number of nations and
provide for referring matters to the ICJ explicitly assume that ICJ judgments will not be enforceable domestically in at least some countries.
The only domestic court in which a litigant sought enforcement of a
Permanent Court judgment denied enforcement, and a number of other
domestic court decisions contain language inconsistent with such enforcement. The judgments of other international tribunals, established
by international agreements describing the judgments of those tribunals
66. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A/21, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 324, 331-32 (1987).
67. 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 145-46.
69. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517; 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
70. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 187,
192, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 78, 79 (1957); American Convention, supra note 3, art. 68, at 119.
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in language similar to that in the ICJ Statute, have been held not to be
directly enforceable in domestic courts. Where the judgments of international tribunals are directly enforceable domestically, the founding
instruments of those tribunals contain express language to that effect.
And, it might be added, considerable scholarly authority supports the
proposition that ICJ judgments do not bind national courts.'
Finally, it should be pointed out that any other interpretation of the
effect of the ICJ's judgments could be quite awkward. Only countries
may be parties to contested cases brought before the ICJ, 72 and those
cases can, at minimum, involve any type of international law issue, including issues arising under any type of treaty. 73 This jurisdiction can
encompass issues of great political complexity, such as questions regarding the use of force. Attempts to enforce ICJ judgments in the
courts of a country against which a judgment was rendered could thus
force that country's courts to address issues those courts are neither intended nor able to address. Enforcement of such judgments against
another country would raise different, if equally difficult problems. As
Rosenne has observed,
The fact that [the problem of governments' failure to comply
with binding ICJ decisions] is essentially a political one cannot
be disguised by placing emphasis upon an alleged basic norm
which States must observe, such as pacta servanda sunt, and
building on that a logical structure explaining why in law States
are under certain duties. An approach to the problem of the
post-adjudication phase of judicial settlement cannot be based
on any presumption of law that States observe their treaty obligations, because the real problem arises when the conduct of
States differs from the pattern of conduct prescribed for them in
the binding statement of what their legal obligations are. In the
nature of things States never condition their conduct solely by
reference to legal considerations nor are they asked to do so.
This explains why the problem is essentially political, using the
word politicalin its broadest sense.75
Given the unavoidably political character of the problem of enforcing ICJ decisions, it would have been unwise for governments, when
71. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (5th ed. 1998)
and sources therein cited.
72. ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 34.
73. Id. art. 36.
74. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 933-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
75. Rosenne, supra note 28, at 208.
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establishing the ICJ, to permit enforcement of the ICJ's judgments by
domestic courts. In other words, the conclusion suggested by an examination of conventional legal sources is also the conclusion that makes
the most sense from a policy perspective. Therefore, to the extent that
criticism of the Breard decision rests on the argument that domestic
courts are legally obliged to directly enforce ICJ decisions, that criticism is misplaced.
III.

INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT OF AMERICAN
COURTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY

It seems clear, then, that the Supreme Court's failure to carry out
the ICJ order at issue in Breard cannot be seen as contrary to any legal
obligation imposed on the United States court system by existing international instruments. Suppose, however, that a different instrument
were at issue. As mentioned in the foregoing discussion, some treaties
establishing international tribunals clearly provide for domestic court
enforcement of their judgments.76 While it is unlikely as a matter of political reality that the ICJ Statute would be amended to provide for
domestic enforcement, such a development certainly is not impossible
as a matter of international law, and political realities can change. Suppose, then, that the United States elected to become a party to a treaty
permitting an international tribunal to review the actions of American
courts in individual cases with respect to alleged errors on matters of
international law. This tribunal would be empowered to overturn the
determinations of those courts. It could, for example, require dismissals
or new trials in criminal matters in cases in which American courts had
affirmed a conviction. Does the Constitution permit the United States to
enter into such a treaty? Or suppose a situation like that in Breard, in
which there is no treaty obliging American courts to implement the
judgment of an international tribunal. Could the Supreme Court require
a state court to enforce such a judgment anyway? Could the president, in
the exercise of his foreign affairs power, at least require state courts to
stay their proceedings pending the decision of an international tribunal?
This section of the article addresses these issues. The first portion of
the discussion concludes that Article III of the Constitution precludes
the United States from entering into a treaty permitting what amounts to
review of the judgments of federal courts by international tribunals. The
second portion sees principles of constitutional federalism as developed
76. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 70, arts. 187,
192 at 78-79; American Convention, supra note 3, art. 68, at 119.
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in a long line of Supreme Court decisions as forbidding the federal government to subject state courts to international review. The last part of
this section concludes that the authority of the Supreme Court does not
extend to compelling state courts to defer to international tribunals in
the absence of a treaty obligation, and that the president's foreign affairs
power likewise provides no basis for forcing such deference on the
states.
A. InternationalReview of Federal Courts
Suppose that Angel Breard had been arrested by the FBI for violation of a federal criminal statute and subsequently tried and convicted in
federal court, but never informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention. Suppose that Breard appealed his conviction on the ground of
the breach of his rights under the Vienna Convention, but the Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari. Suppose, finally, that a treaty purported to permit an
international tribunal to review the actions of the American federal
courts in this matter and to grant whatever relief those courts themselves
could grant on an appeal, and that this tribunal ordered a new trial in
federal court for Breard because of the Vienna Convention violation.
That is, this hypothetical tribunal granted relief analogous to that sought
by Paraguay before the ICJ in the actual Breard case, with the domestic
courts of parties to the treaty establishing the tribunal required by that
treaty to enforce the tribunal's orders. Could the federal courts give effect to the tribunal's ruling consistent with the Constitution?
Consideration of this question starts with the language of Article III.
That Article provides, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."" The decisions of
the Supreme Court applying this language appear to read it as forbidding modification by anyone of any final decision of the judicial
department.
This view of the law is first made clear by statements appended to
Hayburn's Case.78 The case involved a federal pension statute which
required the Circuit Courts of the United States to determine applicants'
qualifications for pensions and to recommend the amount a given applicant should receive. Such recommendations, however, were subject to
the power of the Secretary of War to refuse to place an applicant on the
pension list, despite a favorable recommendation from the court, if the
1.
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl.
78. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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Secretary had "cause to suspect imposition or mistake."79 The suit had
been brought by the Attorney-General, seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania to perform its
duties under the Act with respect to a -particular pensioner. 80 The Supreme Court never ruled on the matter, as the statute was amended to
eliminate the judicial role in the pension process prior to the Court's
announcement of its judgment in the case." However, the reporter appended to the opinion statements by the judges of three of the Circuit
Courts asserting that they felt bound not to carry out the act on the
grounds of its unconstitutionality. Each of the three courts quoted asserted the unconstitutionality of any review of any decision by a federal
court by either of the other two departments of the federal government,
insisting that such review was inconsistent with the vesting of judicial
power exclusively in the judiciary.82
On related grounds, the Court held itself without jurisdiction to hear
an appeal from the Court of Claims in Gordon v. United States. 3 Although the Court in that case stated only that it saw such jurisdiction as
unconstitutional, without explaining that conclusion,84 United States v.
O'Grady5 is helpful in understanding Gordon. According to the Court
in O'Grady, the problem in Gordon was that the statute governing payments of judgments on matters adjudicated by the Court of Claims,
including judgments subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, in
essence subjected such judgments to the revision of the Secretary of the
Treasury.86 The Court went on to state:
Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a
cause, and inasmuch as the Constitution does not contemplate
that there shall be more than one Supreme Court, it is quite clear
that Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme
Court to the re-examination and revision of any other tribunal or
any other department of the government.

79. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2-4, 2d Cong., 1 Stat. 243, 244 (1st Sess. 1792)
(expired).
80. Hayburn, 2 U.S. at 409.
81. Id. at 409-10.
82. Id. at 410-12.
83. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
84. Id.
85. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874).
86. Id. at 647.
87. Id. at 647-48. This reading of Gordon receives some support from a draft opinion in
Gordon written by Chief Justice Taney and found in his papers after his death. After this
draft was discovered, it was, at the request of members of the Supreme Court, printed as an
appendix to 117 U.S. at 697. Those justices who had been on the Court at the time of the
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The court applied the same reasoning in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Plaintiff's suit in that case, claiming damages for fraud under the
federal securities laws, had originally been dismissed as time-barred,
following a Supreme Court decision determining the limitations periods
applicable to such claims. Subsequently, Congress enacted a statute
purporting to re-open cases dismissed as time-barred by reason of the
Court's decision on the limitations issue. 9 The Court in Plaut held that
the attempt by Congress to revive these cases was unconstitutional as a
violation of separation of powers principles. 9° In particular, the Court
stated:

Inc.88

Article III establishes a "judicial department" with the
"province and duty ...to say what the law is" in particular
cases and controversies. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
177 (1803). The record of history shows that the Framers
crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed
understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review
only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that "a judgment conclusively resolves the
case" because "a 'judicial Power' is one to render dispositive
judgments."9 '
The opinion goes on:
Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes
the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by
Gordon case recalled that the Taney draft was intended to be the basis for any opinion in that
case. Id. In his draft, Taney first states:
[N]or can Congress authorize or require this Court to express an opinion on a case
where its judicial power could not be exercised, and where its judgment would not
be final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties, and process of execution
awarded to carry it into effect.
Id. at 702. He then stresses that a judgment which is not conclusive on the rights of the parties is in fact no judgment at all, and thus not in fact an exercise of the judicial power
established by the Constitution. Id. at 702-03. Taney then notes the limited effect of any
judgment rendered by the Supreme Court on an appeal from the Court of Claims, in light of
the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to effectively nullify that judgment by refusing to
seek from Congress an appropriation to pay it, and of Congress likewise to nullify the judgment by refusing to vote such an appropriation. Id. at 702-03. After more illustrations of the
unconstitutionality of such an arrangement, he concludes that the Court could not exercise
appellate jurisdiction on these facts. Id. at 703-06.
88. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
89. See id. at 213-15.
90. Id. at 217-19.
91. Id. at 218-19 (emphasis in the original)(citation omitted).
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retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case
was something other than what the courts said it was. Finality of
a legal judgment is determined by statute, just as entitlement to
a government benefit is a statutory creation; but that no more
deprives the former of its constitutional significance for separation-of-powers analysis than it deprives the latter of its
significance for due process purposes.92
These cases all deal with acts purporting to subject the federal
courts to control either by Congress or by the federal executive. However, the language of the opinions seems to indicate that the vice of the
measures held unconstitutional does not arise simply from the involvement of those departments of government in particular matters before
the courts. Rather, the Court holds these measures unconstitutional because they see the courts as limited to the exercise of judicial power,
and they see situations in which the federal judiciary, taken collectively,
does not have the last word in a given case as the exercise of something
other than judicial power and thus outside the scope of Article III.
There would thus appear to be three related reasons to question the
constitutionality of any treaty which permitted an international tribunal
to overturn a judgment by an American federal court. First, the foregoing opinions make clear that neither the Congress nor the federal
executive may exercise what amounts to a power to revise the opinions
of the federal courts. Given this, it is hard to see how one house of Congress could combine with the president to confer such a power upon an
international tribunal. The second apparent problem with such a treaty is
perhaps more fundamental. Clearly, if the decision of an Article III
court is to be reviewed by some non-Article III tribunal, that decision is
not the last word on the particular case before the court. For the federal
courts to address a matter which is subject to such review, therefore,
would not be an exercise of judicial power, according to the foregoing
cases, and thus would violate Article III. Finally, and perhaps fancifully,
if the judicial power is the power to have the last word in a given case,
our hypothetical treaty, by giving the power to say the last word in a
class of cases to an international tribunal, could be seen as creating a
second Supreme Court, since this tribunal would by hypothesis have
authority over all federal courts. It would thus violate Article III's requirements that, first, the judges of the Supreme Court be Article III
judges,93 and second, there be only one Supreme Court,94 since the
92.
93.
94.
stitution

Id. at 227 (emphasis in the original).
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
Cf U.S. v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48 (1874) (showing that the Conprobably does not envision more than one Supreme Court).
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existing Supreme Court would presumably remain supreme for cases
lacking an international law component. Thus it appears, for example,
that a treaty permitting the ICJ to overturn determinations of the federal
courts would be unconstitutional.
One immediate response to the foregoing is to point to the famous
case of Missouri v. Holland.95 That case appears to uphold a very broad
authority in the federal government to make treaties. It does not, however, support an argument for a complete absence of restrictions on the
treaty power. First, it certainly did not hold that the treaty-making
power was unlimited; on the contrary, the Court stated in that case:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the
treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different
way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could
not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could,
and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government' is not to be found.96
Moreover, that case dealt with an alleged interference with the
power of the states, rather than an issue of the separation of the powers
of the branches of the federal government.97 Again, the Court in Holland
stressed that the treaty there in question did "not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution."98 At issue here,
however, is constitutional language that is at least implicitly prohibitory: Article III's language regarding the allocation of the judicial
power of the United States, as "judicial power" has come to be understood by the courts. Finally and most fundamentally, Holland addressed
only an issue of whether a treaty could be the vehicle for the adoption of
a particular rule of substantive law; the issue under consideration here,
however, goes to actions amounting to alterations in the structure of
government, not simply to the rules to be applied by existing structures.
Holland, then, does not bear on this discussion.
There are two further lines of argument that might seem to support
the constitutionality of our hypothetical treaty. First, a nineteenth century international claims settlement procedure, in which the United
States participated, led to an award against the United States based in
part on decisions by the Supreme Court which the claims commission
95.
96.
97.
98.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 433.
See id. at 432-35.
Id. at 433.
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saw as erroneous. 99 At first blush, this looks like a reversal of the Su-

preme Court by the claims commission, contradicting the argument that
such an arrangement would violate Article III. As will be shown below,
however, this conclusion depends on a mischaracterization of the results
of the procedure, and is therefore mistaken.' °° The second line of argument looks to arrangements concluded under certain trade agreements
which vest in international arbitral panels the authority to decide certain
claims alleging violations of federal statutes relating to international
trade.'0 ' This would seem to be a very direct delegation of federal judicial authority to an international tribunal, and could lead one to wonder
why, if such a delegation is lawful, the sort of delegation to the ICJ that
would be involved in our hypothetical treaty would be unlawful. As will
be shown
below, however, the two situations are not, in fact, compara02
1
ble.
The first line of argument derives from the actions of a commission
established by the Treaty of Washington of 1871.03 The commission
was intended, among other things, to address claims of certain British
subjects against the United States for actions taken by United States
forces during the Civil War.' ° Among the claims as to which the commissioners made awards to claimants were several deriving from the
capture of British merchant vessels as prizes of war by American naval
vessels enforcing the blockade of the ports of the Confederacy. 5 These
awards were made despite the fact that, in several cases, the Supreme
Court had affirmed judgments which had either condemned the vessels
as prizes or, though restoring the vessels to those claiming them, had
denied the claimants damages sought on the ground that the captures of
the vesselshad been illegal. 'O In each of these cases, the commissioners
99. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, U.S.-U.K., arts. XII-XVII, 17 Stat. 863, 867-

89.
104. Id. art. XII, 17 Stat. at 867.

105. Robert S. Hale, Report of Robert S. Hale, Esq., in U.S.
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

3 PAPERS
1, 110-48 (Kraus Reprint

DEP'T OF STATE,

Corp. 1966) (1873).
106. The commissioners held that the claimants were entitled to awards on the grounds
of the illegal captures of the vessels Sir William Peel and Science, even though those vessels
were not subsequently condemned as prizes. Id. at 100-10, 112-14. They further made
awards to claimants in respect of the Hiawatha and the Circassianon the grounds of the
illegality of the captures and subsequent condemnations as prizes of those vessels. Id. at
130-36, 142-48. The Supreme Court had upheld decrees of lower courts denying damages
for illegal captures in the cases of the Sir William Peel and the Science. The Sir William
Peel, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 517 (1866); The Science, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 178 (1866). It had upheld
decrees of condemnation, which necessarily denied damages, in the cases of the Hiawatha
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reached conclusions different from those of the Supreme Court, basing
awards on the illegality of captures and condemnations which the Court
had upheld. It would seem, therefore, that these awards amounted to
revisions of judgments of the Supreme Court.
Such a description of the commission's actions, however, would be
mistaken. First, under prize law, naval personnel responsible for an illegal capture were personally liable for damages caused by that capture
and suffered by those with interests in the vessel.' 7 Further, those same
personnel were entitled to share in proceeds from the sales of lawfully
condemned vessels.' 8 Thus, the judgments of the Supreme Court did not
merely deny damages to, and in some cases take property from, those
originally interested in the vessels in question. They also, in the case of
condemnation, transferred property to private individuals, and, in those
cases in which damages for illegal captures were denied, protected private individuals from damage judgments.
The awards of the claims commission, however, did not disturb
these effects of the Supreme Court judgments at issue. Rather, according to the Treaty of Washington, the governments which had established
the claims commission assumed the sole obligation of paying awards
made to claimants."0 That is, the actual results of the Supreme Court's
judgments were not disturbed; persons originally held not liable for
damages were not obliged to pay those damages, and persons who had
received shares of prize money were not compelled to disgorge that
money. The claims commission did not presume to alter the legal relations created by the American judgments. In contrast, in cases like
Breard,making the determinations of international tribunals binding on
American courts would necessarily mean that the legal relationships
determined by those courts could be disturbed by the tribunal's determinations. The claims commission established by the Treaty of
Washington provides no precedent for such an arrangement.
The second line of argument supporting exercise of Article III
judicial power by an international tribunal derives from certain
statutory provisions implementing the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement"0 and the North American Free Trade

and the Circassian. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); The Circassian,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1864).
107. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-24 (1804);
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) app. at 10, 11-12 (1847).
108. Act of Apr. 23, 1800, § 5, 2 Stat. 45, 52 (repealed 1862); Act of Jul. 17, 1862, § 2,
12 Stat. 600, 606 (repealed 1864); R.S. § 4630, 30 Stat. 1007 (1899).
109. Treaty of Washington, supra note 103, art. XV, at 869.
110. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA].
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Agreement' (the Agreements). Under certain circumstances, administrative agencies of the United States government are authorized to
impose countervailing duties on products imported from other countries,
and to impose antidumping duties on products from other countries sold
in the United States at less than fair market value. ' 2 The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction to review administrative actions
regarding these matters." 3 However, such administrative determinations
regarding goods from the countries who are parties to the Agreements
may not be reviewed by the Court of International Trade, but are instead
reviewed by binational panels'"4 composed of persons selected by the
United States and by the other country involved from rosters of persons
selected by the parties to the treaty at issue." 5 That is, the persons reviewing decisions by American administrative agencies applying
American statutes are at least in part chosen by the government of a
country other than the United States, rather than according to the process required for selection of judges in Article III. It might thus appear
that this amounts to the exercise of power under Article III by a nonArticle III tribunal.
Again, this conclusion would be mistaken. The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg"6 the rule that cases
involving "public rights" may be assigned by Congress to tribunals not
established under Article III.'' While the definition of a public right is a
subject of some debate,"' the Supreme Court held as long ago as 1929
that disputes over actions by executive agencies regarding application
by those agencies of the tariff laws in particular cases were matters that
Congress could assign for decision however it saw fit." 9 Thus binational

panels operating under one or the other of the Agreements are not exercising power required by the Constitution to be exercised by an Article
III court, and furnish no precedent for vesting such power in an international tribunal.
The hypothetical treaty described above, then, would be unconstitutional as applied to federal courts. It would divest those courts of

111. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFA].
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671h, 1673-1673h (1999).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1999).
114. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (1999).
115. FTA, supra note 110, Annex 1901.2, at 393-94; NAFrA, supra note 111, Annex

1901.2, at 687-88.
116. 492 U.S. 33(1989).
117. Id. at 53-55.

118. Id. at 54-55.
119. Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451, 457-60 (1929).
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judicial power by rendering their judgments subject to revision by a tribunal outside the structure established pursuant to Article III.
B. InternationalReview of State Courts
The preceding section hypothesized a treaty permitting an international tribunal to effectively reverse the judgments of federal courts in
cases involving some question of international law and concluded that
such a treaty would be unconstitutional. This section examines the constitutionality of a treaty resembling the one just discussed, but applying
to the courts of the states rather than to federal courts.
To a certain extent, of course, the two types of treaties overlap. For
example, if a state judgment has been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, the hypothetical international tribunal would have to, as it
were, go through the Supreme Court to reach the state judgment. In light
of the conclusions of the preceding section, a treaty purporting to permit
such a procedure could not survive constitutional scrutiny.
Suppose, however, a treaty that would permit cases to be taken directly from state courts to the international tribunal. Such a procedure
would avoid the difficulty addressed in the preceding paragraph. Would
this treaty raise constitutional questions?
Necessarily, the analysis of this question will take a form different
from that employed in the preceding section. With respect to federal
courts, the language of Article III, reinforced by the courts' interpretations of that language, bars external oversight of the federal courts'
treatment of particular cases. No similar language in the Constitution
applies to state courts. Further, two distinct lines of Supreme Court decisions point in somewhat different directions regarding this issue.
Additional complications arise from the fact that, although some judicial language addresses situations analogous to that here hypothesized,
that language is dictum.
The first line of cases relevant to this issue deals with the question
of the scope of the authority of the federal government to enter into
treaties that in some fashion impinge on the states. Some of those cases
deal with treaty language purporting to address subjects that would, at
the time the cases were decided, have been thought to have been clearly
outside the authority of Congress to regulate by statute. Indeed, regulation of some of those subjects would even today be difficult to bring
within the powers of Congress described in Article I of the Constitution.
For example, Chirac v. Chirac"' considered the effect of a treaty on
Maryland's laws regarding the escheat of lands of persons dying intes120. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
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tate. Under the Maryland statute in force at the time, alien heirs of
Maryland landowners were, if French, permitted to inherit land in the
state, provided that the land in question would escheat if the heirs neither became citizens of Maryland nor sold the land within ten years of
becoming seised of the estate.'2 ' Chirac arose when French heirs of a
Marylander sued in federal court to obtain land which the state had escheated and sold to the defendant in the case.122 The heirs relied on a
treaty between the United States and France in effect at the time they
inherited the land. 23 That treaty provided that aliens who stood to inherit
land in states that prohibited inheritance of land by aliens would be
permitted an unlimited period within which to sell or otherwise dispose
of the land.'24 The Court held that the French heirs were entitled to possession of the land. Further, its opinion makes clear that it saw the
question as solely a matter of the proper construction of the treaty; the
fact that the Maryland law conflicting with the treaty dealt with two
subjects-land ownership and escheat of decedents' estates-at that
time clearly within the exclusive control of the states was treated as irrelevant. 5
Hauenstein v. Lynham 126 also involved a question of the escheat of
land of an intestate whose alien heirs would not have been permitted to
inherit under the law of the state where the land was located. 27 The case
turned on the construction of a provision of a treaty with Switzerland
giving to alien heirs "such term as the laws of the State or canton will
permit to sell such property.', 128 The Court held that this language allowed states to establish a period within which such sales must take
place, but that, in states fixing no such period, alien heirs were not required to effect the sale within any particular period.' 29 The Court
expressly rejected any suggestion that the laws of the state had any
bearing on the matter, given its construction of the treaty. It also cited
other cases to support its argument for the great scope of the treaty
power, even in cases involving land titles and inheritance. 3 °

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 274-76.
Id. at 271, 276-77.
100 U.S. 483 (1879).
Id. at 483-85.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 485-87.
Id. at 488-90.
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These cases, dealing with subjects among those least likely to be
seen as subject to federal regulation prior to.the New Deal,' illustrate
the striking breadth of the subjects which the Court saw as properly
within the scope of the treaty power.' This reading of federal authority
regarding treaties draws support from a consideration of the circumstances within which the Constitution was drafted. During the period
1776-1787, the United States entered into a number of treaties. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the "Treaties" which the Constitution empowered the president to conclude with the Senate's advice and
consent 33 were expected to address subjects similar to those covered by
treaties that predated the Constitution. Further, the Constitution characterized the Confederation-period treaties as the "supreme Law of the
Land."'3 4 Yet those treaties included provisions whereby each treatypartner guaranteed that, within its territory, nationals of the other party
should enjoy rights to freedom of conscience and to pass personal or
even real property by will or through the operation of the intestacy
laws.'3 5 However, the Constitution and Bill of Rights gave the federal
government no power to compel the states to respect freedom of conscience, and, as noted above, questions of land titles and decedents'
authority of the federal govestates were seen as beyond the regulatory
136
century.
eighteenth
late
the
in
ernment
131. See Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340-42 (1901) (stating that questions of inheritance by aliens are matters of state law); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217
(I 923)(states' reserved power includes authority to determine whether aliens are permitted to
hold land). For a post-New Deal case supporting these conclusions, see U.S. v. Burnison,

339 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1950).
132. For other examinations of this issue that reach similar conclusions and collect
cases, see Richard B. Collins, Nineteenth Century Orthodoxy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1157,
1162-63 (1999); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of
ForeignRelations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1999).
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
2.
134. Id. art. VI, cl.
135. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, U.S.-Neth., art. IV (liberty of conscience), art. VI (right to testate and intestate disposition of personalty), 8 Stat. 32, 34, 36;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, U.S.-Swed., art. V (freedom of conscience),
art. VI (right to testate and intestate disposition of personalty), 8 Stat. 60, 62, 64; Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Prussia, art. X (right to testate and intestate disposition of personalty and right of heirs to sell realty), art. XI (freedom of conscience), 8
Stat. 84, 88, 90.
136. See cases cited supra note 131. Justice Chace's opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 235-36, (1796), made clear that there was disagreement as to whether the
effect of treaties concluded by the United States prior to the adoption and implementation of
the Constitution superseded contrary state law of their own force. Further, whatever the legalities of the matter, state enactments during this period effectively blocked implementation
of the undertakings made by the United States in various treaties. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL,
TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT

37-43 (1904). Ware held, however, that,

whatever the situation prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the effect of the Supremacy
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In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, 37' it should also be noted
that these early treaties included topics that apparently required action
by local executive officials. Several of them permitted the parties to appoint consuls or vice-consuls in one another's ports.'38 The terms of a
consular convention between the United States and France, implementing the earlier treaty between the two countries, throw light on the
undertaking the United States presumably saw itself as making when it
agreed to exchanges of consuls. Under the terms of that convention, a
party's "officials competent" were obliged to arrest deserters from merchant vessels of the other party, upon proof by that party's consul that a
given individual was such a deserter.'39 Since there would have been no
federal officials competent to effect such arrests in 1788, the officials
upon whom these duties were imposed would necessarily have been
state officials. The Convention also required that the consul be notified
upon the release from confinement of any crew-members from such
ships arrested for crimes.' 4° In 1788, most if not all such crew-members
would have been arrested and confined by officers of the state governments, not by federal officers. Although this convention was concluded
after the ratification of the Constitution (but before the United States
government had actually been organized)' 4' its terms suggest that the
earlier treaties' authorization of exchanges of consuls implied a willingness to assume obligations which, among other things, would have
required local law enforcement officials in ports to assist foreign consuls in their dealings with ships' crews. Assuming the Framers were
aware of these implications of an agreement to exchange consuls, their
conferral of the treaty power on the federal government not only
authorized that government to address subjects on which Congress
could not legislate, but also permitted the federal government, through
the treaty
power, to impose affirmative duties on non-judicial state offi142
cials.
Clause was that a treaty superseded contrary state law of its own force. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at

236-38,249, 281,282.
137. See infra notes 172-93 and accompanying text.
138. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., art. XXIX, 8 Stat. 12, 28;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, U.S.-Neth., supra note 135, art. XXI, at 44;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, U.S.-Swed., supra note 135, art. XXVI, at 74;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Prussia, supra note 135, art. XXV, at
98.

139. Consular Convention, Nov. 14, 1788, U.S.-Fr., art. IX, 8 Stat. 106, 112.
140. Id. art. XI at 112-13.
141.

See CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH

SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION XXi (Johnny H. Killian and George A. Costello
eds., 1996).
142. This analysis would seem to address the concerns raised by Professor Vfizquez regarding the effect of Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) on treaties requiring that
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This record suggests that the Framers assumed that the power to
make treaties was the power to address, among other things, subjects
which the federal government would not be able to regulate in a purely
domestic context. It was also the power to impose at least limited duties
on non-federal officials. Given all this, the statement in Missouri v.
Holland4 1 that "[iut is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not
,4 seems to
deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could ...
characterize fairly both the tenor of the Supreme Court's decisions on
this subject and the expectations of the Framers of the Constitution.'45
To be sure, the Supreme Court has asserted the existence of limits to
the treaty power, albeit in dicta. In addition to the language from Holland quoted above, the following language appears in DeGeofroy v.
Riggs, 46 in which the Court upheld the treaty-based right of French nationals to inherit realty in the District of Columbia.

foreign consuls be notified upon the arrest of any of their nationals, see Carlos Manuel
VAzquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999). Of course,
it might be argued that it would be assumed that any duties imposed on state officials by
treaties concluded during the period of the Articles of Confederation fell to the federal government after the Constitution went into effect. However, carrying out those some of those
duties, e.g., arresting deserters from French merchant ships, would have required the establishment of a substantial federal police force in a good many port cities. While the power of
the federal government to create such a force is clear-indeed, it has done something analogous by forming the Immigration and Naturalization Service-it seems most unlikely that
the members of the Constitutional Convention would have expected that the Constitution
would have required such a step. Such an intrusive federal presence would surely have
seemed undesirable even to Federalists; the more reasonable assumption is that no such action was seen as compelled by the Constitution. And if that assumption is correct, the
Constitution must have been understood to permit treaties concluded after its entry into force
to impose on the states duties similar to those imposed under pre-constitutional treaties,
143. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
144. Id. at 433.
145. These conclusions lead me to differ with Professor Bradley's suggestion that the
treaty power should be construed as coextensive with the power of Congress to legislate
domestically., see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 390, 456-61 (1998). That approach seems to me inconsistent with both the likely
intent of the Framers of the Constitution, given the context in which they worked, and certainly with the decisions of the Supreme Court. While Bradley is quite correct that
understandings of the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause have broadened
since 1787, id. at 459, (and, one might add, since the authority of Congress was expressly
expanded by the Fourteenth Amendment) this rule of thumb could lead to needless difficulties in treaty interpretation. To repeat an example from the text of this article, why should it
be necessary to consider whether the Commerce Clause would permit Congress to regulate
matters relating to decedents' estates (e.g. the forms of wills) in order to uphold a treaty on
this subject, when the authority of the United States to enter into such treaties has been recognized at least since the Constitution has been in force?
146. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
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The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited, except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government, or of its
departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself, and of that of the States. It would not be contended
that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government, or in that
of one of the States, or a cession
of any portion of the territory
47
consent.
its
without
latter,
of the
In Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe,' 8 which addressed whether
the owner of a railroad on a federal military reservation in Kansas was
subject to local taxes,'49 the Court observed that "[t]he jurisdiction of the
United States extends over all the territory within the States, and therefore their authority must be obtained, as well as that of the State within
which the territory is situated, before any cession of sovereignty or political jurisdiction can be made to a foreign country."'"5 The Court
supported this assertion by referring to the association of officials of
affected northeastern states in negotiations between the United States
and Great Britain regarding the border between Canada and the United
States."'
Yet the cases addressing the breadth of the treaty power, and those
referring in dicta to the limits on that power, are not the only ones relevant to this discussion. Also important are the cases addressing the basic
limitations of the authority of the federal government to affect the
states. As will be seen, the language, if not necessarily the precise
holdings, of the federalism cases are difficult to reconcile with an
authority in the federal government to make treaties with no regard
whatever for federalism considerations.
The Supreme Court was called upon to consider the nature of the
authority of the states in Texas v. White.'52 This case was brought by
Texas in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, seeking to compel certain individuals to return to the state certain bonds originally
issued to it by the federal government. ' The defendants challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court, arguing that, by seceding, Texas had ceased to
be a state of the union, and thus fell outside that element of the original

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 267.
114 U.S. 525 (1885).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 541.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
Id. at 717.
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jurisdiction of the Court extending to suits by states against individual
citizens of other states.15 4 In considering this argument, and after stressing the indissoluble character of the union created by the Constitution,'55
the Court went on to observe:
But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means
implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the
right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of
Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution,
though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all
powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that
"the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to
separate and independent existence," and that "without the
States in union, there could be no such political body as the
United States." Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their
union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably
said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of
their governments, are as much within the design and care of
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks 56to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.
The Court went on to hold that Texas could not cease and had not
ceased to be a state, notwithstanding its purported secession.'57
This idea that the Constitution protects the autonomy and sovereignty of the states to the extent that powers are not delegated to the
federal government has provided the rationale for a number of the
Court's decisions. In Lane County v. Oregon,"8 the Court was faced
with a challenge to an Oregon statute requiring payment of state taxes in
gold or silver coin. An Oregon county had paid its annual taxes in
United States notes. The Oregon courts had held payment by this means
to violate the statute, notwithstanding the county's argument that acts of
154. Id. at 719.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 725.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 726.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).
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Congress making such notes legal tender overrode the Oregon statute.'59
The Court held for the state, reading the federal statute as not intended
to compel the states to accept tax payments in notes." In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the proposition that "in many articles of
the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their
proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized,"'' 6' and on the necessity of the taxing power to the states'
authority.
The Court was also forced to address the question of the existence
of constitutional limits on federal authority over the states in Collector
v. Day. 62 That case arose from a challenge by a state judge to a federal
income tax. 63 In considering the matter, the Court stated:
We have said that one of the reserved powers was that to establish a judicial department; it would have been more accurate...
to have said the power to maintain a judicial department. All of
the thirteen States were in the possession of this power, and had
exercised it at the adoption of the Constitution; and it is not
pretended that any grant of it to the general government is found
in that instrument. It is,. therefore, one of the sovereign powers
vested in the States by their constitutions, which remained unaltered and unimpaired, and in respect to which the State is as
independent of the general government as that government is
independent of the States.164
The Court went on to hold that federal taxation of the salary of a
state judicial officer was unconstitutional, posing too great a risk of
subjecting the existence of state judiciaries to the control of the federal government. Day was subsequently qualified in Helvering v.

159. Id. at 72-73.
160. Id. at 76-78.
161. Id. at 76.
162. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
163. Id. at 113-14.
164. Id. at 126.
165. Id. at 126-28. The Court cited the circumstances in Veazie Bank v.Fenno, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 533 (1869) in support of its fears for the effects on state judiciaries of the tax in
question. Veazie involved a federal tax imposed on the circulation of bank notes by statechartered banks which was attacked as intended to destroy those banks. Id. at 533-34, 548.
The Court sustained the constitutionality of the tax, notwithstanding this attack. Id. at 548. It
also observed, however,
It may be admitted that the reserved rights of the States, such as the right to pass
laws, to give effect to laws through executive action, to administer justice through
the courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of State
government, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of Congress.
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6 6 which held that the earnings of employees at the Port of
Gerhardt,'
New York Authority were subject to income taxation by the federal
government. Gerhardt was distinguished from Day as not involving
employees who performed "an indispensable function of state government."' 67 But even while qualifying Day, the Court characterized that
case as follows:

The question there presented to the Court was not one of interference with a granted power in a field in which the federal
government is supreme, but a limitation by implication upon the
granted federal power to tax. In recognizing that implication for
the first time, the Court was concerned with the continued existence of the states as governmental entities, and their
preservation from destruction by the national taxing power. The
immunity which it implied was sustained only because it was
one deemed necessary to protect the states from destruction by
the federal taxation of those governmental functions which they
were exercising when the Constitution was adopted and which
were essential to their continued existence.
The Court went on to quote, with apparent approval, language from
Day concerning the importance of avoiding federal infringement upon
those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of [the
states'] sovereign and reserved rights, one of which is the establishment of the judicial department, and the appointment of
officers to administer their laws. Without this power, and the
exercise of it,' the Court declared, 'we risk nothing in saying
that no one of the States under the form of government guaranteed by the Constitution could long preserve its existence. A
despotic government might. ... 8
Day was finally overruled in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe. 69
Even Graves, however, was not based on a rejection of the assertion in
Day of the unconstitutionality of actions threatening the autonomy of
state government. Rather, it was based on the Court's conclusion that
taxes on the salaries of state government employees could not be seen
either as taxes on the government or as imposing any sort of tangible

Id. at 547. The Court in Day cited this language in striking down the income tax there at
issue. 78 U.S. at 128.
166.
167.
168.
169.

304 U.S. 405 (1938).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 414-15.
306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939).
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burden on the government. 7 " That is, while Graves rejects the conclusion drawn by Day from the principle that the constitution protects the
autonomy of the states, it does not question the principle itself.
The Court has also had to address the status of the states in suits addressing what could be called structural aspects of the Constitution.
Among the issues of this type which the Court has had to address is that
of the sovereign immunity of the states. Its decisions have upheld the
states' immunity from suit in a wide variety of contexts, generally because of the implications of the structure of the United States. Thus, the
Court upheld the states' immunity to suits in admiralty, observing:
That a state may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the
construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has
become established by repeated decisions of this Court that the
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a state without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
state, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one
brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of
which the amendment is but an exemplification. 7 '
The most recent sovereign immunity case relevant to this discussion
is Alden v. Maine. 72 Alden, in common with a number of other recent
cases, 73 reads the sovereign immunity of the states quite broadly. The
case was a suit by a group of probation officers employed by Maine alleging that the state had violated certain provisions of the federal labor
laws pertaining to the plaintiffs. They originally sued in federal court,
where their suit was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. They
then brought their claim in the courts of Maine, where it was also dismissed on sovereign74 immunity grounds. They appealed this dismissal to
the Supreme Court.
The Court held that Article I conferred on Congress no power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states in their own courts. '75 It

170. Id. at 483-86.

171. Exparte State of N.Y., 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
172. 67 U.S.L.W. 4601 (U.S. June 23, 1999).

173. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 67 U.S.L.W. 4580 (U.S. June 23, 1999); College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 67 U.S.L.W. 4590
(U.S. June 23, 1999).
174. See Alden, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4603.

175. Id. at 4615.
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stressed the "constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities" and
the federal system's reservation to the states of "a substantial portion of
the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential
attributes inhering in that status.' 76 It concluded that the original understanding of the Constitution, early congressional practice, and the
courts' own cases all were inconsistent with the existence of any federal
power under Article I to abrogate state sovereign immunity.' 77 Its
opinion stressed in particular. the inconsistency of such a congressional
power with the structure of the Constitution. The Court observed that,
"[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent
with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the
governance of the Nation.' 78 Relying on that observation, the Court
concluded that a congressional power to abrogate the immunity of states
to suit in their own courts was inconsistent with the dignity of the states,
threatened both their financial integrity and their ability to structure
their public policy coherently, strained their ability to respond to their
own citizens, and forced state judiciaries to deal with matters beyond
their experience and jurisdiction.'79 Acknowledging that Article III
strongly supports the inference that state courts may be obliged to hear
suits involving federal law, the Court went on to state that "[t]he Article
in no way suggests, however, that state courts may be required to assume jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts and
forms no part of the judicial power of the United States."' 8
A different type of structural issue arose in New York v. United
States.'"' There, the Court considered a state's challenge to a federal
statute requiring states either to regulate low-level nuclear waste or to
take title to that waste.'12 The Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional, in that Congress lacked the authority under the Constitution to
coerce state legislatures to adopt any particular legislation.'8 3 In doing
so, it explicitly relied on the understanding expressed in Lane County
and Texas v. White, among other cases, that states' autonomy is consti-

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 4603.
Id. at 4611-13.
Id. at 4613.
Id. at 4613-14.
Id. at 4614,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 151-54.
Id.at 175-79, 188.
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tutionally protected,1 4 and stressed that "[s]tates are not mere political
subdivisions of the United States.' 85
Just as New York dealt with what the Court saw as a federal effort to
coerce state legislative action, Printz v. United States'8 6 addressed a federal statute purporting to impose duties on state executive officials.
Specifically, the statute required state law enforcement officials to make
certain investigations, in some circumstances, in connection with some
transactions by firearms dealers.' 7 Two stateofficials who were within
the class charged with duties under the statute challenged its constitutionality.' 8 The Court held the statute unconstitutional, stating:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold
that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, nor those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is
involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."'
In resolving the case, the Court first stressed that, during the first
years of the federal government's operation, when persons then active
in government would presumably have direct knowledge of the intended
reach of the Constitution's provisions, any statutes which Congress enacted imposing duties on state officials took effect only with the consent
of the state involved. '9° In addition to its historical argument, the Court
stressed as well the incompatibility of the challenged statute with the
Constitution's system of dual sovereignty, citing, among other cases,
Lane County, Texas v. White, and Gerhardt to support its conclusion
that the Constitution was intended to protect the residual sovereignty of
the states. The Court also stressed the implications of various constitutional provisions and the rejection by the Constitutional Convention of a
system of government under which federal authorities would use the
184. Id. at 162-63.
185. Id. at 187.

186. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
187. Id. at 902-04.

188. Id. at904.
189. Id. at 935.
190. Id. at 905-11.
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states as instruments of federal governance. Likewise, the Court emphasized the importance of the state's accountability to its own citizens, and
the safeguard to the liberty of the people afforded by such a system. 9'
Finally, the Court characterized the holdings of its earlier cases as
clearly inconsistent with any power in the federal government to compel
state executive officials to administer federal programs. 92 It further asserted, after questioning the argument that the Constitution forbade only
federal requirements that would force the states to make policy,
Even assuming, moreover, that the Brady Act leaves no
"policymaking" discretion with the States, we fail to see how
that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty. Preservation of the States as independent and
autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than (as Judge
Sneed aptly described it over two decades ago) by "reducing
[them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress," . . . It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they
remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere
of authority. It is no more compatible with this independence
and autonomy that their officers be "dragooned" ... into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the
independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.' 93
To be sure, the force of this language is somewhat compromised by
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Although she joined the majority opinion, she observed in concurrence that "[i]n addition, the Court
appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid." 94
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor made clear her agreement with the conclusion that Congress could not constitutionally require state officials to
make the investigations required by the statute. '95
The cases thus present a conundrum. Those construing the treaty
power characterize that power in very broad terms, overriding limitations on federal authority applicable in domestic cases; none of these
cases, however, address any exercise of the treaty power comparable to
that in a treaty giving a hypothetical international tribunal authority to
191. Id. at
192. Id. at
193. Id. at
194. Id. at

918-22.

925-33.
928 (citations omitted).
936 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 935-36.
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review decisions of the states' courts. Dicta speak in quite general terms
of limitations on the treaty power, but, even aside from their character
as dicta, offer little guidance in determining the scope of those limitations. And the cases addressing structural restraints on federalism speak
in broad terms in stressing the limitations on the authority of the federal
government to interfere with the functioning of the states; none, however, deal with cases involving the treaty power, or any aspect of the
federal government's authority over foreign relations.
One possible solution to the dilemma derives from United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.9 6 In that case, individuals had been indicted for exporting prohibited weapons to a war in South America, an
act made criminal by a joint resolution of Congress as implemented by a
presidential proclamation; the lower court had quashed the indictment,
and the government appealed.' 97 The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court.' 98 In so doing, it stated as follows:
[S]ince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of
state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States
from some other source. During the Colonial period, those powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the
control of the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence, 'the
Representatives of the United States of America' declared the
United (not the several) Colonies to be free and independent
states, and as such to have 'full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce and to do all
other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right
do.'
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies,
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit
in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency-namely,
the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war and
peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the
Declaration of Independence.... When, therefore, the external
sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it
196. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
197. Id. at 312-14.
198. Id. at 333.
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immediately passed to the Union.... That fact was given practical application almost at once. The treaty of peace, made on
September 3, 1783, was concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the 'United States of America.' The Union existed
before the Constitution, which was ordained and established
among other things to form 'a more perfect Union.' Prior to that
event, it is clear that the Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be 'perpetual,' was the sole possessor of external
sovereignty, and in the Union it remained without change save
in so far as the Constitution in express terms qualified its exercise....
It results that the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never
been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.'99
Justice Sutherland's opinion cited several cases in support of these
conclusions. 2° He also quoted a speech before the Constitutional Convention by Rufus King in which King had denied that the states had
dealt with foreign sovereigns or raised military or naval forces. 20 While
it is not clear that the opinion's discussion of any of these issues was
necessary, or indeed relevant, to the resolution of the case before the
Court, it remains the most extreme judicial assertion of the extraconstitutional nature of the federal foreign affairs power. If CurtissWright accurately states the law, it provides powerful support for federal authority to make a treaty subjecting state courts to review by an
international tribunal.
The difficulty in relying on this language, however, is that the argument it presents does not withstand examination. It will be noted that
the argument is, in form, primarily a factual one: Justice Sutherland asserts that certain situations in fact existed, and derives legal conclusions
from those facts. But the facts were not as Sutherland characterizes
them. As pointed out by Van Tyne over ninety years ago, the Continental Congress, during the revolution, simply did not enjoy the status
199. Id. at 316-18 (footnotes and citations omitted).
200. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U. S. ( 3 Dall.) 54 (1795); Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202

(1890); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583
(1912); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933).
201. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317.
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Sutherland ascribes to it.202 All of the actions of the Continental Congress which Sutherland lists were taken through the exercise of powers
understood to be delegated by the states. °3 In particular, the Congress
did not adopt the Declaration of Independence until each state's delegation was authorized to do so; it was understood among the delegates that
the declaration could not affect any colony unwilling to adhere to it.20 4
Further, while Sutherland is-of course correct in asserting that the Continental Congress engaged in diplomatic exchanges and raised an army
and navy, he ignores the facts that the states reserved the same powers
to themselves, and, more importantly, exercised them.2 5 Similarly, Professor Lofgren has shown that, after the Revolution, the Congress
established under the Articles of Confederation understood its powers
over foreign affairs to have been expressly delegated by the states.20
Sutherland's reliance on the treaty of peace with Great Britain is
both misplaced and misleading. While he is correct that the title of that
treaty describes it as the "Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United
States of America and his Britannic Majesty, 2 °7 Article I of that treaty
explains that language by providing:
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz.
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina,
South-Carolina, and Georgia to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for himself,
his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part
thereof.208
Contrary to Sutherland's analysis, this language seems to be best
understood as a recognition of the independence and sovereignty of
each of the states individually, rather than as an acknowledgment only
of the independence of a corporate entity known as the United States.
202. Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical

Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907).
203. See id. at 531-36.
204. See id. at 536-38.
205. See id. at 539-41.
206. See Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 16-17 (1973).
207. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 80.
208. Id. art. I at 81. Other treaties concluded during the period of the Articles of Confederation likewise specified each of the states, as well as the United States, as a party. See
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., supra note 135 at 32; Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, U.S.-Swed., supra note 135 at 60.
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Aside from his reliance on factual assertions, Sutherland also relied
on certain authorities. However, Lofgren demonstrated that Sutherland's
characterization of King's speech at the Constitutional Convention was
misleading and that, in any event, others at the Convention expressed
different views.2°9 Further, as the preceding paragraph demonstrates,
King in any case himself misstated the facts. Lofgren also shows that
Sutherland's reading of the cases he cites do not bear the construction
he gives them.2 ° In short, the facts regarding the exercise of powers relating to foreign affairs were not as Sutherland represented them to be in
Curtiss-Wright, nor did those living at the time the Constitution was
framed understand the source of the new government's authority over
dealings with other nations as Sutherland asserts that they did. CurtissWright, then, can be of little help in addressing the issue under discussion. It is thus necessary to attempt to seek from still other cases
principles that can reconcile the two arguably conflicting lines of cases
discussed above.
A place to start is Texas v. White.2t' Unlike the situation in most of
the non-treaty federalism cases, the Court in that case was not interpreting Article I grants of power to Congress, but Article III's grant to
the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction in cases to which states are
parties. Its conclusions in that case, therefore, should be broadly applicable. The issue in White was fundamental: did an entity which had
purported to secede from the Union retain its character as a state for
purposes of the Court's original jurisdiction? 12 And in that case, the
Court observed that,
...the

preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states.2 3
This conclusion, read with the Constitution's "guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican form of Government, ' ' 21 would seem to

See Lofgren, supra note 206 at 19-20.
Lofgren, supra note 206 at 20-21, 23-24.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
Id. at 719.
213. Id. at 725.
214. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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make clear that there are limits on the federal authority to encroach on
the states under any of its powers, including the treaty power.215
But while this conclusion seems easy to support, it is also of little
practical help. The question must be what counts as a forbidden encroachment. One could not resolve the problem by invoking the holding
in Texas v. White that states are "indestructible, ' 216 since subjecting state
courts to review by an international tribunal could hardly be equated
with destroying state governments; the governments of the countries
comprising the European Union cannot very well be said to have been
destroyed by reason of the scope of the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice. 2 7 The issue thus becomes, what actions, not amounting
to the literal destruction of the governments of the states, are precluded
by the language of the Constitution and the structure of the Union?
While it is tempting to resolve this problem by simply applying the
recent structural decisions by the Supreme Court in the treaty context,
there is reason to hesitate to do so. Those decisions did not deal with the
treaty power and at least the rule of Printz v. United States21s seems
doubtful in the treaty context. As discussed above, the United States has
been entering into treaties imposing duties on state officials since before
Washington was inaugurated.2 9 Either a practice extending over more
than two centuries turns out to have been forbidden by the Constitution,
or Printz's absolute prohibition of federal imposition of duties on state
officials cannot be applied in the treaty context without modification.
But if the holdings of the recent cases cannot be applied mechanically in the treaty context, neither can they be completely ignored. It is
215. In this connection, it is interesting to consider the actions of the federal government in settling the dispute with Great Britain regarding the boundary between Canada and
Maine (to which the Court made reference in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S.
525, 541 (1885)). The treaty by which that dispute was resolved required Maine to surrender
its claims to an extensive area. American authorities had assumed that such was the likely
result prior to entering into negotiations on the subject. According to a letter sent by Secretary of State Daniel Webster to the Governor of Maine, the President saw the United States

as unable to enter into such a treaty without Maine's agreement, and for that reason included
commissioners from Maine in the treaty negotiation. Letter from Daniel Webster to Governor Fairfield (April 11, 1842) in DANIEL WEBSTER, 6 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 272, 273
(16th ed. 1872). In private correspondence, Webster claimed "not the slightest doubt" as to
the authority of the United States to act without Maine's consent. See Cessions of Territory,
5 MOORE DIGEST § 737, at 174-75. The Department of State has subsequently taken a position claiming greater authority with respect to cessions of territory than asserted by Webster
in his letter to Fairfield, see United States-Mexican Boundary, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 30, at
697-99.
216. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
217. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 70.
218. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
219. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. Obviously, the Vienna Convention, supra note 11, imposes duties on local officials, id. art. 36, 1.
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crucial to keep in mind that the state sovereignty issues presented by the
recent federalism cases are of a different order from those of the Supreme Court's treaty decisions. The federalism cases can be seen as
addressing questions relating to the authority of the federal government
to alter the structures of the governments of the states. Could Congress
require a state legislature to act without regard to its collective determination as to the best policy for the state to follow? Could it require a
state court to exercise jurisdiction denied to it by the state's own laws?
In contrast, the duties imposed by treaties and the Supreme Court's
treaty cases involve no more than a substitution of one legal rule (that
prescribed by the treaty) for another (that prescribed by the state). The
structure of state government is not at issue in those cases.
Furthermore, the dicta which purport to give examples of limits on
the treaty power give particular emphasis to structural changes in state
governments as instances of acts outside the capacity of the treaty makers to effect. Thus Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe asserted that a
state's consent must be obtained before any part of the state's territory
may be subjected to the authority of a foreign country.2 ° Geofroy v.
Riggs stated more generally that the treaty power did not extend to "a
change in the character of the government ...of one of the states. 22 '
Thus the treaties contemporaneous with the Constitution do not purport
to bring about fundamental changes in state governmental structures, the
treaty cases do not address treaties which have such an effect, and dicta
relating to treaties deny that they can have such an effect. To the extent,
then, that the issue is determining what counts as a structural change in
state government which cannot be accomplished through conclusion of
a treaty, nothing in the jurisprudence relative to treaties is inconsistent
with addressing this issue by examining cases dealing with federalismbased limits on the authority of Congress.
Considering then what the federalism cases can contribute to analysis of a hypothetical treaty subjecting state courts to review by an
international tribunal, we start with Collector v. Day.222 That case was
quoted in Helvering v. Gerhardt223 to support Gerhardt's stress on the
importance of the protection of the functions of the states' judiciaries in
the maintenance of state sovereignty, 224thCorinGrad
although the Court inGerhardt
distinguishes the facts of Day from those of the case before it. 25 Gerhardtwas cited in Printz to support that case's invocation of the residual
220. 114 U.S. 525, 540-41.
221. 133 U.S. 258, 267.

222. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
223. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
224. 304 U.S. at 414-15.
225. Id. at415-24.
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sovereignty of the states as a constitutional principle; 226 the language
from Gerhardt which Printz cites, however, is Gerhardt's quotation
from Day. While the holding in Day has been overruled,227 what
amounts to its indirect citation in Printz surely supports the proposition
that Day's characterization of the protection of the states' judiciaries as
a crucial constitutional principle retains its validity.
What then can Day offer to this discussion? Most significant is the
following language: "[Establishment and maintenance of a judiciary] is,
therefore, one of the sovereign powers vested in the States by their constitutions, which remained unaltered and unimpaired, and in respect to
which the State is as independent of the general government as that
government is independent of the States. 228
Alden is to the same effect. Among its reasons for holding Congress
powerless to eliminate states' sovereign immunity in their own courts
was its determination that "[a] State is entitled to order the processes of
its own governance, assigning to the political branches, rather than the
courts, the responsibility for directing the payment of debts. 229 Indeed,
in its language, at least, Alden goes still further. The Court in that case
faced the argument that the Congressional power to require state courts
to enforce federal law permits Congress to require state courts to hear
cases from which states would be immune in federal court. In rejecting
that argument, the Court stated that "[t]here can be no serious contention.., that the Supremacy Clause imposes greater obligations on statecourt judges than on the Judiciary of the United States itself.'' 3 It also
observed that Article III "in no way suggests ... that state courts may
be required to assume jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal
courts and forms no part of the judicial power of the United States.""
These cases suggest two reasons why a treaty subjecting state courts
to review by an international tribunal would be unconstitutional. First, if
Alden means literally that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
limitations which may not be imposed on the federal courts and those
which may not be imposed on state judicial systems, then the discussion
above 232 establishing that such review may not be imposed on the federal
courts ends the matter.
Second, and more fundamentally, these cases clearly evince a determination that the Constitution requires the preservation of the states'
226. 521 U.S. at 919.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939).
Collectorv. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 126.
67 U.S.L.W. at 4614.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 76-119 and accompanying text.
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judiciaries and the states' freedom to determine how their judicial systems are to function. This conclusion suggests that the proper inquiry
for determining the constitutionality of international review of state
court decisions is whether such review would amount to a fundamental
alteration in the operation of those courts. If so, such review would be
unconstitutional.
While federal decisions construing the scope of the judicial power
of the United States are of course not controlling with respect to the
scope of the power of state judiciaries, they are certainly suggestive.
And such cases strongly suggest that international review of state decisions would amount to a significant erosion, if not indeed the
destruction, of the states' judicial authority. Thus Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc. 33 holds that Congress encroaches on the judicial power when
it subjects the decisions of courts to review or revision by some entity
outside the structure established by Article III, since the judicial power
is the power to decide cases, subject only to review within the Article III
hierarchy."' The opinions in Hayburn's Case and the holding in Gordon
v. United States are to the same effect.235 Obviously, state courts would
not be finally deciding cases, subject only to such federal review as
contemplated by Article III, if their judgments were, in effect, reviewed
by an international tribunal. Therefore, requiring that states' courts be
reviewed by such a tribunal would be unconstitutional.236
A question remains. As noted above,237 in practice, treaties of the
United States have imposed duties on local officials since the days of
the Articles of Confederation. In light of the flat prohibition on such
"commandeering" which, Printz held, limits Congress's powers under
Article ,238 there is an obvious tension between United States practice
regarding treaties and the rule of Printz. Therefore, either Printz was
wrongly decided or there exists some principled ground of distinction
between imposition of duties on state officials by the federal government in the Article I context, on the one hand, and in the treaty context,
on the other.

233. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).

234. Id. at 218-19, 227.
235. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
236. It might be argued that the federal government could somehow delegate to an international tribunal at least the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals of state
decisions involving treaties. But such "delegation" is simply another term for permitting
some authority outside the hierarchy established by Article III to review state courts. As the

text makes clear, such a proceeding would be unconstitutional.
237. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
238. 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
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Such a distinction exists. Understanding it requires consideration of
the reasons which would impel the United States to enter into a treaty.
Usually (aside from anomalous situations such as that in Missouri v.
Holland) the United States takes such a step because it wants something
from the other party or parties to the treaty, not because it seeks to use
the treaty as a mechanism for domestic regulation. Domestic effects
may be inevitable, however, since the treaty partner(s) of the United
States typically will not provide what the United States wants without
receiving something from the United States. Not infrequently, this exchange of obligations is reciprocal: Ruritania agrees to do X for the
United States if the United States will do X for Ruritania. Thus, if what
the United States wants from the other country would require that
country to alter its domestic policy in some way, the quid pro quo demanded of the United States might well require a similar alteration in
domestic policy.
When the United States enters into a treaty requiring the parties to
alter their domestic legal arrangements, its objective is often the securing to individual American citizens of certain benefits available only
upon the agreement of a foreign government. For example, the bilateral
treaties into which the United States entered even before the Constitution took effect, discussed above,2 39 required both parties to the treaties
to follow particular rules of law regarding decedents' estates in cases
involving nationals of the other party to the treaty, and to respect the
religious freedom of nationals of the same countries. These treaties thus
protected both the property and religious interests of Americans entering the countries with which the treaties were concluded. The consular
convention with France ' required each party's law enforcement officials both to arrest deserters from the other's merchant vessels, at the
behest of the other party's consul, and to notify that same consul upon
the release from confinement of merchant seamen of the consul's nationality who had been arrested for other reasons.14 ' The convention thus
assisted the captains of American merchant vessels fearful of losing
crew members in foreign ports.
Since the treaty partners of the United States would provide these
legal protections for American citizens abroad only if their nationals
received similar protections within the United States, necessarily the
United States could obtain the benefits of such treaties for its citizens
only if it structured itself so as to be able both to negotiate such treaties
and to comply with the obligations the treaties imposed. But there were
239. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
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only a limited number of ways in which the United States could have
been structured to obtain this result. The federal government could be
permitted both to deal with foreign governments and to have general
legislative authority, which would necessarily include authority to comply with treaty engagements. Alternatively, general legislative authority
could be left to the states, the federal government being limited to certain delegated powers; the states could likewise be left-to work out their
own individual arrangements with foreign countries, which the states
could then implement. Either of these possibilities raised obvious problem. The first effectively would have abolished the states. The second,
by permitting the states to negotiate separately with foreign governments, would have posed obvious barriers for the coherent conduct of
American foreign policy. To avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, the Constitution has been read to take a third approach: while forbidding the
states to deal with foreign governments and limiting the legislative
authority of the federal government, this reading permits the federal
government to take actions through treaties involving changes in law in
areas not subject to its legislative control, including imposing obligations on local officials which could not be imposed through statute.
Since this latter point seems in direct contradiction to Printz, it must
be addressed expressly. Consider the issues of arresting foreign seamen
who desert and keeping track of the release of those jailed for other reasons. Of course, the federal government did not in 1789 and does not
today have general law enforcement authority throughout the United
States. It does, however, have the authority to enforce such law as it is
competent to enact, and has in fact in this century created large law enforcement organizations, including agencies whose responsibilities are
closely related to foreign relations, for example, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The question on these subjects, then, went not so
much to legal limitations on the federal government as to the political
legitimacy of the steps which federal assumption of these responsibilities would have required. Federal implementation of obligations of this
type would as a practical matter have required the federal government to
establish what would amount to dozens of local police forces solely for
this purpose. Such a vast federal law enforcement apparatus would have
been unthinkable in 1789. But if there could be no federal enforcement
of obligations of the sort involved here, the only alternative was enforcement by state officials. That is, as a practical matter, guaranteeing
to American shipowners the cooperation of foreign officials in dealing
with the problem of defaulting seamen would have been impossible unless the federal government could oblige state authorities to extend
similar cooperation to foreigners.
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This approach to "commandeering" in the treaty context seems
more consistent with federalism than any alternative. It preserves exclusive federal authority to deal with foreign governments, while avoiding
both the intrusions on state authority which would be inevitable if a federal law enforcement agency had been created to arrest deserting foreign
seamen and the difficulties that would have been faced by captains of
American merchantmen if the United States had been unable to enter
into engagements like those discussed ....
But this arrangement was necessitated solely by the Framers' decision to forbid the states to deal with foreign governments while
effectively reserving to the states what in 1789 was, and in some respects still is, essentially exclusive legislative authority to deal with
certain subjects that arose between the United States and foreign governments. The treaty power requires a broad construction, as the
Supreme Court observed in Hauenstein, because "If the national government has not the power to do what is done by such treaties, it cannot
be done at all, for the States are expressly forbidden to 'enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation.' ,,24 Domestic regulation not flowing
from an agreement with a foreign government presents no similar problem. If the states wish to address a matter which does not fall within the
exclusive legislative authority of the federal government, there is no
barrier to their doing so equivalent to the prohibition on states entering
into treaties with foreign powers. Since the situation regarding domestic
regulation differs so fundamentally from that involving treaties, the justification for a broad construction of the treaty power simply does not
exist with respect to the authority of Congress under Article I.
The foregoing analysis also suggests the character of the
"qualifications to the treaty power" which, according to Missouri v.
Holland2 43 "must be ascertained in a different way" from those used to
determine the limits on the authority of Congress to legislate.2 4 Measures which alter state legal rules, or require state officials to assume
duties, which, while additional to.those required by state law, are nonetheless consistent with those officials' functions in state law, can be
justified as being the type of measures a completely independent sovereign might well assume in order to obtain similar concessions from
other sovereigns for the benefits of their own citizens. Actions that alter
the shape of the state in some fundamental way, however, as by effectively altering the structure of its government, are very hard to fit within
the model of undertakings necessary to assure some reciprocal benefit to
242. 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1879) (citation omitted).
243. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
244. Id. at 433.
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Americans abroad. The federal treaty power, in short, is a power to obtain benefits for the citizens of all the states through measures
necessarily affecting powers normally reserved to state governments. It
is not a power to reshape those governments.
C. Breard." Other Issues
The foregoing discussions address the most important issues raised
by Breard. Two other points, made by commentators who disagreed
with the result in that case, nonetheless call for comment. Each appears
to misstate the authority of particular federal institutions facing a situation such as Breardpresented.
Professor Slaughter has argued as follows:
The Supreme Court was directly requested by the ICJ not to defer to its decision, but simply to wait. It was asked to take a
measure that was within its power as a matter of federal law, to
give the ICJ a chance to decide whether the case was properly
before it and to weigh and consider the legal issues pending before both courts. A stay would have preserved the ultimate
rights of all parties (other than a purported right of the state of
Virginia to execute its death row inmates as quickly as possible), until the ICJ could at least express its views on the issue
and have them considered not only by the Supreme Court, but
by other U.S. and state officials. Such a step is the minimum respect required. 25
Professor Slaughter characterized her position as one of urging the
246 Aside from
relevance of the concept of comity on the facts of Breard.
the uncertain fit between Professor Slaughter's application of the comity
concept on the facts of Breard and the Supreme Court's conditions on
the concept's use, it is in any case not clear that federal law would
have permitted the Supreme Court to issue a stay in Breard.
from references to certain concurring and dissenting opin• Aside
241
ions, to private expressions of views by two justices of the Supreme
Court,2 9 and to cases applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
Professor Slaughter cites only three cases to support her argument. Roby
245. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 711.
246. Id. at 708.

247. See Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522,
543-46 (1987).
248. See Slaughter, supra note 8, at 709-11.
249. Id. at710-11.
250. Id. at 709.
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v. Corporation of Lloyds2 ' affirmed a trial court decision applying a
forum selection clause designating a foreign forum in a case involving
alleged infringements of the federal securities laws, while Omron
Healthcare Inc. v. MacLaren Exports Ltd.21 2 affirmed a trial court's application of a similar clause in a case involving an alleged trademark
infringement. As Professor Slaughter fails to note, however, the Roby
court reached its result only after stating,
We believe that if the [plaintiffs] were able to show that available remedies in England are insufficient to deter British issuers
from exploiting American investors through fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure, we would not hesitate to
condemn the choice of law, forum selection and arbitration
clauses as against public policy.253
It elected to enforce the forum selection clause only after concluding that English remedies were adequate to protect the interests of the
American plaintiffs. Likewise, the Omron court stressed both the absence of any public policy against litigating cases of the sort 2before
it in
54
a foreign forum, and the entirely private nature of the dispute.
255 the
In the third case, Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger,
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of a district court to stay its proceedings after the trial court in a parallel
Belgian action had rendered its judgment and pending the appeal of that
judgment. 256 As Professor Slaughter omits to mention, the federal district court had denied an initial motion to dismiss based on the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, even though the Belgian action had been initiated some sixteen months prior to the commencement of the American
suit; further, a statute in the state in which the district court sat rendered
the Belgian judgment conclusive."7 On these facts, and noting that
"there is no particularly strong federal interest in ensuring that this dispute be adjudicated in a federal district court or, indeed, in any
American
court, ' and that the Belgian judgment had resolved the
pute,259 the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the action of disthe

251. 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).

252. 28 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1994).
253. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Omron, 28 F.3d at 603-04.
833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 685.

259. Id.
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district court in staying its proceedings had amounted to an abuse of
discretion.2 60
As Professor Bradley has previously noted,26' these cases bear little
resemblance to Breard. All were civil suits-that is, suits involving
claims by private persons, a factor given particular weight in Omron. In
no case did the appellate court compel a trial court to defer to a foreign
forum. The courts in all three were at pains to consider, not simply the
virtues of comity, but also whether any interests protected by American
law would be put at risk by foreign litigation. Furthermore, Ingersoll
Milling, the one case not involving a forum selection clause in which
the trial court had stayed its proceedings in deference to those abroad,
also presented a situation in which relief had been denied until the foreign court had rendered its judgment, and granted only at the point when
American proceedings would have simply duplicated those in Belgium.
In Breard, in contrast, public rather than private interests were at
stake. Moreover, they were public interests of the most basic type: those
represented by the criminal law. The Supreme Court was faced not with
permitting a lower court to defer to foreign proceedings, but with a request to compel such deference in circumstances in which the ICJ had
made clear that its order did not consider the merits of the case2 62 and
therefore did not reflect any attention to Virginia's interests. This case
thus differs from those cited by Professor Slaughter, in which American
courts enforced even forum selection clauses only after assuring themselves that the interests of American parties could be adequately
protected by foreign courts. Certainly, the situation was not one in
which deferring to the other court would have prevented the maintenance of duplicative legal proceedings, as was the case in Ingersoll
Milling. Indeed, the Ingersoll Milling analysis would suggest that the
ICJ violated obligations of comity to the courts of the United States,
since the ICJ elected to address an issue making its way through the
American court system, just as the case in Ingersoll Milling was making
its way through the Belgian court system.
The cases which Professor Slaughter cites, in short, involved a
court's determination that the interest of the parties could be protected
substantially as well in a foreign as in a local court. The argument in
favor of comity in Breard, however, cannot depend on a similar conclusion with respect to that case, since, as shown above, that conclusion
260. Id. at 684-86.
261. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist

Conception, 51

STAN.

L. REV. 529, 560, n. 190 (1999).

262. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 812, 81819. (I.C.J. 1998).
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cannot be justified. Rather, it seems to turn primarily, not on a consideration of the foreign court's ability to consider the local interests at
stake, but on some notion that judges should place great weight on the
sensibilities of judges in other court systems. It is as though a court's
first loyalty is not to the law it is sworn to administer, but to some supra-national judicial fraternity.
Moreover, absent from Professor Slaughter's discussion is any consideration of relevant authority. She refers to no decisions addressing
the circumstances in which the Supreme Court will stay the execution of
a death sentence. Professor Slaughter's argument seems to depend on
the assumption that the Supreme Court has unlimited discretion to block
actions by the states when there is arguably some good reason to do so.
Such an assumption, however, is quite mistaken.
As noted in the brief filed in Breard for the United States as amicus
curiae263 and by the leading authority on procedure in the Supreme
Court," the relative probability that the Court will accept a case for review and subsequently reverse it is a key determinant of the decision to
grant a stay, even of death sentences.265 If there is no prospect of review,
the Court has no basis for interfering with the judgment of the lower
court. In Breard, the full Court decided to deny review, expressing
strong doubt as to the strength on the merits of the claims brought by
Breard and by Paraguay.M If the Court's authority to grant a stay is
limited to situations in which the sentence to be stayed was imposed in a
judgment that the Court is likely to review, how could it grant a stay in a
case in which it had determined that there would be no review? Professor Slaughter, then, errs in asserting that the stay which she thinks
should have been granted was within the power of the Supreme Court to
grant, once it had determined that it would refuse to hear Breard's
claim.
A final element of Professor Slaughter's article is her argument that
a factor counting in favor of the issuance of a stay was that nothing was
at stake beyond delay; a stay would simply permit the ICJ to give its
views, while avoiding any irreparable change in the situation. 267 This
argument is disingenuous. There would be no point in granting a stay
unless the ICJ's judgment in the matter would make some legal difference. But the Court decided in Breard all the questions at issue in that
263. Brief for the United States, supra note 18, at 47.
264. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 693-96, 698 (6th ed. 1986).

265. Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301,
1302 (Scalia, J. 1991); Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 131920 (Rehnquist, Ch. J. 1994).
266. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-78.
267. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 711.
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case. In terms of American law, any determination by .theICJ would
have been irrelevant. Professor Slaughter does not assert that the Supreme Court would have been compelled, as a matter of American law,
to implement an ICJ judgment requiring a new trial for Breard. Professor Slaughter would thus have the Commonwealth of Virginia arrest the
operation of its justice system for the period of years that would presumably have been required for the ICJ to render its decision on the
merits, even though the order indicating provisional measures was nonbinding (applying Professor Slaughter's assumption) and even though
she is unprepared to describe the ICJ's decision on the merits as having
any legal bearing on the resolution of this case as a matter of American
law. This seems a bit much.
In addition to Professor Slaughter's invocation of comity as a basis
for a stay, Professor Vdzquez has argued that, even if the ICJ's order
was not binding, the president possessed the authority to compel Virginia, by executive order, to stay Breard's execution.26 Specifically, he
argues that the Charter of the United Nations, read with the ICJ Statute,
amounts to a delegation to the president of authority to comply even
with non-binding ICJ orders if he believes them to be in the national
interest. Professor Vdzquez's reasoning is that these instruments, in
permitting the ICJ to issue such non-mandatory orders, presupposes that
governments will have the ability to comply with such orders if they
choose to do so. That conclusion, in turn, leads Professor Vdzquez to
argue that, as a matter of American domestic law, it is reasonable to see
adherence to the Charter and Statute as delegating to the president the
authority to respond to such orders, since he is the only official in a position to respond with the speed required when faced with an order
indicating provisional measures.269
This argument is shaky. Nothing in either the Charter or the Statute
of the ICJ explicitly requires a party to these instruments to be in a position to respond to an order indicating provisional measures. And
neither instrument contains any language whatever that could be read as
a delegation to the president of any authority.
Indeed, the more one considers this "delegation" the more curious it
becomes. What power, precisely, is being delegated? To the extent that
compliance with an order indicting provisional measures would involve
only acts clearly within the president's authority as Chief Executive, no
delegation is required. Is the Senate then delegating legislative power,
or judicial power, or both? Presumably both, since one can easily
imagine ICJ orders which would implicate both types of power. Breard
268. Vizquez, supra note 8, at 689.
269. Id.
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itself, involving as it did a matter of a stay of execution, involved power
normally exercised by the judiciary in'the United States.270 An order requiring suspension of the operation of a statute enacted subsequent to
the entry into a treaty and contravening some aspect of that treaty, however, could not be obeyed without exercising legislative power. Are we
then to suppose that the Senate conferred on the president the power to
centralize in himself all the power of the federal government whenever
he thought it necessary to obey a non-binding order of the ICJ-and all
of this by implication? Professor Vdizquez characterizes this reasoning
as "plausible;" that characterization seems doubtful.27 '
In any case, there is reason to doubt the constitutionality of such a
delegation, in the unlikely event it was intended. Although the nondelegation doctrine is in dire straits," it retains some force.273 Further,
even the broadest delegations sustained by the Supreme Court, for ex274
ample, that in Curtiss-Wright, included express words of delegation.
None are present in this case.
Rather than seeing a non-existent delegation in the ratification of
the Charter and the Statute, it would make more sense to see those instruments, collectively, as a non-self-executing treaty. This
characterization follows from the fact that those treaties require future
action-compliance with judgments and orders of the ICJ-without
themselves working whatever changes in domestic law may be required
to take that action.
But if these treaties are non-self-executing rather than delegatory,
there would be no basis either in statute or in treaty for any presidential
authority to issue an executive order requiring compliance with the ICJ
order. That is, such authority would exist only if the president's power
over foreign affairs would permit him to take such action. In other
words, the case most relevant to analyzing presidential power in this
context is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.27 5 This follows because what would be involved here is not a delegation in a treaty, but an
270. The power to pardon is, of course, an executive power. A pardon, however, involves the complete forgiveness of some or all of the penalty imposed on a convicted person.
Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 309-15 (1856); Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 149,
153 (1877). A stay simply interrupts proceedings, with no necessary permanent effect. Further, the president may only pardon "Offenses against the United States," U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis supplied); he may not pardon violations of state law, In re Bocchiaro,
49 F. Supp. 37, 38 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
271. Vdzquez, supra note 8, at 690.
272. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).
273. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (Stevens,
J.), 671-76, 682-88 (Rehnquist, C.J.)(1980).
274. See 299 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1936).
275. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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action that is occasioned by the existence of a treaty, and thus connected
to, though not compelled by, the president's duty to execute the treaty.
Indeed, at one point in his article, Professor Vdzquez describes this putative presidential authority in terms very similar to those of the
preceding sentence, relying as well on the president's authority over
foreign affairs.
As characterized, the executive order that Professor Vdzquez would
have had President Clinton issue encounters difficulties comparable to
those of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills. Since, under
Professor Vdzquez's own assumption, no treaty requires the United
States to obey the ICJ's order, such an executive order would not be
executing the treaty. The order has a judicial character, rather than falling within the purview of the executive. Moreover, a more general
executive authority to execute this non-self-executing treaty would involve elements of legislative authority, both because some provisional
measures orders would, as noted above, require the use of such power,
and because the power to carry out the undertaking embodied in a nonself-executing treaty is itself a legislative function.277 Just as the foreign
affairs and war powers did not, according to the Court in Youngstown,
permit the president to exercise what amounted to legislative authority,2 78 so a similar reliance on the foreign affairs power would not allow

the exercise of both legislative and judicial authority. Indeed, if the argument in the preceding section of this article is correct, neither
Congress nor the treaty makers could constitutionally compel Virginia
to subordinate its judicial system to an international tribunal. That is, the
power Professor Vdizquez would ascribe to the president is not only beyond the authority of the federal executive; it is beyond the authority of
the federal government as a whole.
It might be added that one of Professor Vdzquez's argument for
characterizing the power involved here as executive rings especially
hollow. He asserts that the power to respond to provisional measures
orders must exist in the executive, since the executive is the only branch
of the federal government capable of responding to such orders with the
speed required.2

9

This assertion is hard to square with the speed of the

Supreme Court's action in Breard.
Professor Vdzquez seeks to rely on Dames & Moore v. Regan,""
though he acknowledges that factors on which the court placed great

276. See Vizquez, supra note 8, at 689.
277. See Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
278. See 343 U.S. at 587-89.

279. Vizquez, supra note 8, at 689.
280. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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weight in that case were absent in Breard.28"' The difficulty with his argument is that Breard lacks not merely some, but all of the factors
deemed controlling in Dames & Moore. The Court in that case relied on
a long history of Congressional acquiescence in the exercise of particular powers by the president, coupled with the enactment of legislation to
facilitate such an exercise of powers and express approval of those powers in the legislative history of statutes dealing with related subjects.282
In this case, in contrast, the president has never claimed any authority to
stay proceedings in state judicial systems, so Congress has had no opportunity to acquiesce in such authority. Nor has Congress legislated in
the assumption that such authority would be exercised.
Most fundamentally, a presidential power to unilaterally reshape
state legal systems because of some connection between those systems
and foreign affairs would create all the risks that Justice Jackson described in his opinion in Youngstown, as flowing from similar claims to
unilateral presidential authority based on invocations of the war
power. 283 Professor Vdzquez seems to assume that the president's power
over foreign affairs suffices to overwhelm all other considerations when
some situation presents itself that involves foreign affairs and arguably
requires quick action. But the Supreme Court has simply been unwilling
to confide such unchecked authority to the president.
In short, there is great reason to question the existence of any power
in the president to stop the legal.processes of the states through the issuance of executive orders solely to carry out ICJ orders which, on
Professor Vdzquez's assumption, are non-binding.

IV. AMERICAN COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL COURTSREFLECTIONS ON THEIR RELATIONSHIP

This article has, to this point, explained why the Constitution would
have forbidden any arrangement under which the Supreme Court was
obliged to enforce a binding order from the ICJ to stay an execution. It
also explains why comity considerations would not lead to a different
result, and why the president lacks authority to issue an executive order
compelling a state's courts to enforce an order from the ICJ.
As is clear from much of the discussion in this article, these conclusions are not shared by all academics addressing the issues posed by the
Breard case. For example, a number of professors of international law
281. Vdzquez, supra note 8, at 690.
282. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-82.
283. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-46 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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filed a statement amicus curiae with the Supreme Court during its consideration of Breard in which they asserted that the court's failure to
stay Breard's execution would work "irreparable harm ... to the national interest '' 14and would risk "incalculable and irreparable damage
' Further, once the Supreme Court had renon the international plane."285
dered its decision, some scholars expressed disapproval in strikingly
categorical language.286 Moreover, a number of critics took their positions even assuming that the ICJ order was not binding as a matter of
international law. 2" That is, they saw as seriously objectionable the failure of the Supreme Court to comply with an order which the United
States had, under their assumptions, no legal duty to implement.
Some of this reaction could simply be labeled questionable legal analysis. Thus some of the critics seem to base their criticisms on a broader
reading of the legal obligations of the United States than is justified. 8 Other

284. Statement Amicus Curiae of International Law Professors George A. Bermann,
David D. Caron, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, Richard N. Gardner, Louis Henkin,
Harold Hongju Koh, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, W. Michael Reisman, Oscar Schachter, AnneMarie Slaughter, and Edith Brown Weiss at 7, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No.
97-1390) [hereinafter Law Professors' Statement].
285. Id. at 9.
286. Professor Richardson, in strongly disagreeing with the outcome in Breard, asserted "the essential indivisibility of U.S. and international law under any notion or
obligation to uphold the rule of law." Richardson, supra note 8, at 131. Professor Damrosch
argued that the United States should "have encouraged the two courts to accord due respect
to each other's treatment of matters falling within their respective spheres of competence."
Damrosch, supra note 8, at 704. She went on to imply that the actual result in Breard may
well have left doubts as to whether "the rule of law had been honored." Id. at 704. Professor
Henkin criticized the refusal to stay Breard's execution because it "did not contribute to the
rule of law in international affairs" and "did not strengthen the place of international law in
the law of the United States." Henkin, supra note 8, at 683. Professor Slaughter characterized the granting of a stay by the Supreme Court as "the minimum respect required" for the
ICJ's order, in light of the concept of comity. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 708, 711. As noted,
Professor Vdzquez stated:
If there were merit to the claim that our Constitution and statutes, as they currently
exist, leave the final decision about whether or not to comply with ICJ orders of
provisional measures to state Governors, then we should all be able to agree that
our Constitution and statutes are deficient...
Vdzquez, supra note 8, at 690.
287. Damrosch, supra note 8, at 702; Slaughter, supra note 8, at 708; Vdzquez, supra
note 8, at 686.
288. For example, Professor Vdzquez took the position that, if the ICJ order in Breard
was legally binding as a matter of international law, then American courts had the obligation
to give effect to that order. Vdzquez, supra note 8, at 685. As this article has sought to demonstrate, there is at least some reason to doubt that the instruments establishing the ICJ
create any obligation in domestic courts to implement its judgments. See supra notes 28-75
and accompanying text. Professor Vdzquez, however, gives no hint in his analysis that there
might be some basis for reaching a conclusion different from his.
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aspects of similar analysis of related
questions have been considered and
28 9
found wanting by several writers.
But surely more is going on here than analytical problems. Rather,
the reaction against Breard seems to be based on assumptions that international law ought always to trump domestic law in cases of conflict,
and that domestic institutions should likewise consistently defer to international institutions.290 But what are the justifications for these
assumptions?
Justification is hardly likely to derive from some belief that international institutions, and the ICJ in particular, are functionally superior to
domestic institutions-that is, are more likely to be fair and efficient.
On the contrary, the Breard case itself illustrates serious deficiencies in
the ICJ's procedure. The ICJ granted the provisional measures sought
by Paraguay without considering the merits of Paraguay's claim.2 9' It is
well known that the ICJ does not resolve cases with any great dispatch.
In other words, the ICJ was in essence proposing to delay Breard's execution for a period likely to last at least many months without
establishing any basis for believing that Paraguay was entitled to the
relief it sought, or to any relief. Particularly for an American lawyer,
such a mode of proceeding seems grossly unfair. Federal courts in this
country grant preliminary injunctions only upon a showing that a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.292 Indeed, for an
American court to grant at least some types of prejudgment relief without an assessment of the strength of a plaintiff's claim has been held to
be a denial of due process of law.2 93 As noted above, even in cases involving the death penalty, the Supreme Court will not stay an execution
without some basis for believing that the situation of a particular
289. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997);
Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665 (1986); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 1205 (1988); A. M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts and International Cases,
20 YALE J. 'INT'L L. 1 (1995).
290. For example, Professor Henkin gives as reasons for criticizing the outcome in
Breard the fact that the decision "did not contribute to the rule of law in international affairs" and "did not strengthen the place of international law in the law of the United States."
Henkin, supra note 8, at 683. But the proposition that legal considerations outweigh all other
considerations affecting international affairs is hardly obvious. Cf. Rosenne, supra note 28,
at 208. "In the nature of things States never condition their conduct solely by reference to
legal considerations nor are they asked to do so. "Id.
291. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Apr. 9, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
812, 818.
292. See, e.g, San Antonio Cmty Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d
1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997).
293. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
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petitioner is one that, as a matter of substantive law, calls for appellate
review. 94
Deficiencies in the ICJ's procedures might be of less moment if
deference to international proceedings were necessary to protect the
rights of individual foreign nationals enmeshed in the American criminal justice system. But it is hardly obvious that resort to international
tribunals is necessary on this count. To be sure, the American courts
were unable to ensure that Angel Breard received the rights to which he
was entitled under the Vienna Convention, but these rights were created
to ensure that foreign nationals were not disadvantaged in criminal
proceedings. There seems little reason to believe that the loss of those
procedural rights prejudiced Breard in his trial, given the procedural
protections available to American criminal defendants generally, and
indeed the Supreme Court stressed the highly speculative character of
an argument that denying Breard an opportunity to meet with the Paraguayan consul had an effect on his trial.2 95 In other words, the ICJ's
functioning seems less efficient and less fair than that of American
courts, while there seems little reason to see it as a needed protection for
criminal defendants, at least on the strength of the Breardcase.
Indeed, it might be said that consideration of the functional aspect
of this matter makes the justification for opposing the Breard result
harder to determine, since-had the views of those opposing that holding prevailed-an institution of doubtful fairness and efficiency would
be permitted to control better managed systems. To be sure, such a result can make sense if deference to the less efficient institution advances
some value more important than mere efficiency. The difficulty in this
case is determining what that higher value might be. Certainly, if it
could be shown that legal obligations required deference to the ICJ, it
could easily be argued that such obligations trump efficiency considerations. However, as demonstrated above,296 the argument that some legal
obligation compels deference to the ICJ is probably wrong and at least
is not obviously correct. More fundamentally, and again as noted above,
a number of those calling for deference to the ICJ do so even while
making the assumption that such deference is not legally obligatory.
Necessarily, therefore, such scholars cannot urge such a course in the
name of fidelity to legal obligation if they are prepared to assert their
position even while assuming the non-existence of such an obligation.
If functional considerations do not support a rule of deference to
international institutions, but rather suggest avoidance of such institu294. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
295. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
296. See supra notes 28-75 and accompanying text.
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tions, and if a preference for international judicial institutions is maintained despite these considerations and in the absence of legal
obligation, it begins to appear that the justification for this preference
derives from some idea that judicial settlement of international disputes
is inherently good. On this view, since this process is inherently good,
the desirability of using it is quite unrelated either to the efficiency of
the process or to the existence vel non of any legal obligation to use the
process.
If this view underlies the opposition to the result in Breard,that opposition must be scrutinized with caution. International tribunals are
mechanisms of government, and their utility is no more self-evident
than is that of any other governmental institution. How then could one
defend a belief in the inherent rightness of American courts deferring to
international judicial institutions?
It might be argued that such deference can advance a number of
goals, the desirability of which would be difficult to dispute. First, by
providing a neutral forum for resolving disputes, institutions such as the
ICJ offer an alternative to resolving international disputes through coercive methods which impose costs on persons unable to directly affect
the matters at issue-for example, methods such as the use of force or
harsh economic sanctions. Second, judicial dispute resolution offers the
possibility that the dispute will be resolved on the basis of a legal rule
applied fairly to the strong and weak alike, rather than in the context of
any power disparity between the parties. Finally, the more common the
practice of deferring to international tribunals becomes, the more difficult it would be for states to seek to rely on power-based methods of
dispute resolution. In particular, the example set by the United States,
currently the most powerful state, can be very powerful; if it defers to
the ICJ, it reinforces the argument that the tools of power ought not be
employed in resolving disputes, while if it does not defer, it encourages
similar behavior in other states unwilling to impose upon themselves
burdens which the United States will not assume.
Beguiling as these arguments are, however, they do not withstand
examination. First, judicial dispute resolution is an alternative to some
other method of resolving an international controversy only when all
parties to the dispute are willing to abide by the judges' determination.
This follows, in part, because the jurisdiction of international tribunals
is entirely voluntary.297 This also follows because, as noted above,298 the
ICJ cannot enforce its own judgments. If the losing party does not comply voluntarily, the prevailing party has no means of benefitting from its
297. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 36.
298. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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legal victory without resort either to the Security Council, or to the same
tools of power for which the Court is intended to be a substitute. In
other words, judicial protection of states' interests is available only
against those other states which are open to such methods of dispute
resolution. The idea that judicial resolution of disputes can avert harsher
approaches makes sense only if it is assumed that states willing to resolve their disputes peacefully would, in the absence of a judicial forum,
resort to harsher methods to address their differences. Surely, however,
one may be skeptical of any assumption that states sufficiently peacefully inclined to take a dispute before a court would nonetheless resort
to coercion if the court were not available.
The second argument for judicial resolution of disputes-the belief
that judicial resolution is somehow more fair than alternatives-would
seem to be clearly true only procedurally. Certainly, the neutrality of a
judicial forum is an advantage to otherwise disadvantaged disputants
(though this advantage can, presumably, be outweighed by procedural
disadvantages, e.g., judicial delays in rendering judgment). But whether
such methods are substantively fair obviously depends on the legal rules
to be applied. Whether those rules are fair depends on a number of factors, but the existence of courts to enforce them would not seem to be
crucial. In any case, the meaning of "fairness' in this context is not obvious. A state may regard a rule as unfair because it affects negatively
an interest the state regards as both legitimate and vital, regardless of
the genesis of the rule. To the extent that states perceive their interests
on a particular subject as requiring differences in approach, it may be
impossible to frame international legal rules on that subject that are both
generally applicable and generally perceived as proper.
Finally, the argument for a "demonstration effect" of resort to judicial dispute settlement-the idea that states will be more inclined to rely
on such settlements if they see other states doing the same thingwould seem to ignore the whole question of states' interests in the disputes. Presumably, the key issue for a state contemplating judicial
resolution of a dispute is whether such a proceeding would advance the
interests of the state in question. If the state concluded that judicial proceedings would not protect its interests, it is very difficult to believe that
it would resort to such proceedings anyway out of a desire to emulate
other states. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine why a state which saw
its interests advanced by such proceedings would nonetheless refrain
from using them solely because other states did not.
All in all, the argument that great deference to international judicial
institutions would advance the goals described above seems to depend
on an assumption that international law and international legal institu-
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tions are adequate, by themselves, to protect states' crucial interests.
And that assumption seems contradicted by the foregoing arguments,
and by the obvious disbelief in that idea demonstrated by the day-to-day
practices of states. As Rosenne has observed,"[i]n the nature of things
States never condition their conduct solely by reference to legal considerations nor are they asked to do

SO° ' 99

But if there are no obvious benefits from a policy of automatic deference to international tribunals, such an approach would clearly impose
costs. Most obviously, important aspects of international law and the
operation of international institutions such as the ICJ are not subject to
the control of American political institutions, and thus cannot be responsive to the concerns of American electorates. To accord controlling
weight to such a body of law and such institutions surely raises questions as a matter of democratic legitimacy. The same issue would be
raised by the application of the principle of comity of courts which Professor Slaughter advocates, 3°° since it would apparently require
American courts to accord the interests of other judiciaries very nearly
as much weight as they give domestic laws and institutions. The American judiciary has traditionally not seen its duty in this light.3 °'
Furthermore, such an approach would likely run afoul of traditional
American suspicion of government. After all, the "outstanding characteristic" of the American political system, according to comparative
political scientists, is distrust of government.3 2 If this is true, how likely
is it that Americans would tolerate the conferral of significant authority
on an international tribunal which is in no way accountable to American
voters? Certainly, the anti-World Trade Organization demonstrations in
Seattle in 1999 suggest that some segments of American society are
deeply suspicious of international institutions of governance.303
One is forced to believe that support for the importance of international judicial institutions reflects, not so much a dispassionate analysis
of the benefits of such institutions to the United States, as an almost
299. Rosenne, supra note 28, at 208.
300. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 708.
301. See, e.g., Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 306-07 (1829), stating:
In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary [sic], it is
scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures
adopted by its own government. There being no common tribunal to decide between them, each determines for itself on its own rights, and if they cannot adjust
their differences peaceably, the right remains with the strongest.
302. ALAN NORTON, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

10 (1994). See also

SAMUEL HUMES

IV,

LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL POWER

121 (1991).
303. See Michael Elliott, The New Radicals,

NEWSWEEK,

Kenneth Klee et al., The Siege of Seattle, id. at 30-35.

Dec. 13, 1999, at 36-39;
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faith-based conviction in the insignificance of national affiliations in the
face of the common interests of humanity, and a corresponding desire to
move authority from national governments to institutions not limited by
national boundaries. However disinterested such beliefs may be, their
correctness is not so obvious as to justify a fundamental change in the
attitudes of American judges toward the ICJ.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion establishes that the Statute of the ICJ and
the U.N. Charter, taken together, are best interpreted as not creating an
obligation in states parties to those instruments to implement even
binding judgments of the ICJ in domestic courts. The article also demonstrates that the Constitution does not empower the federal
government to subject either the federal courts or the state courts to review by an international tribunal. In addition, this paper makes clear
that the Breard matter could not properly have been resolved either by
the Supreme Court's staying Breard's execution in the name of comity
or by an executive order compelling Virginia not to execute Breard. Finally, this article has sought to show that much of the opposition to the
result in Breard flows, not so much from convincing demonstrations of
legal error, as from the conviction of the absolute primacy of international institutions which 3 Professor Bradley has called the
"internationalist conception." 04
These conclusions have practical consequences. For example, if this
analysis is correct, the United States is precluded by the Constitution
from accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. This follows because that court would not hear a case from the
United States until any complainant had sought relief from American
courts, and because countries accepting its jurisdiction are obliged to
enforce its damage awards in their domestic courts. In cases where the
American courts deny relief and the Inter-American Court subsequently
makes an award of damages, the requirement of domestic enforcement
means that, in effect, the American judgment denying relief has been
304. Bradley, supra note 261, at 539. This article analyzes the "internationalist conception" in considerable detail. Id. at 539-56.
305. The conclusion in the text follows from the fact that any complaints of rights
violations must first go to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. American
Convention, supra note 3, art. 61, at 117. The Commission can deal with a complaint only if
domestic remedies have been exhausted with respect to the rights violation alleged. id. art.
46 at 113. If the case reaches the Court, article 68 of the American Convention requires that

any damage judgment it renders be enforced domestically by the state against which the
judgment runs. Id. at 119.
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nullified. As demonstrated in the foregoing pages, the federal government cannot constitutionally enter into a treaty creating such an effect.
But the issues raised by Breard go beyond the immediate practical
implications of the case. They involve as well the question of whether
American institutions should focus primarily on the interests of Americans as defined by Americans, or instead on facilitating the shift of
increasing levels of authority to international bodies. In Breard, the Supreme Court has made clear that it does not see itself in the first
instance as but one court in a supra-national judicial system, but rather
as the Supreme Court of the United States.

